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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON MACROECONOMICS AND FINANCE
Qiusha Peng
João F. Gomes
This dissertation consists of two essays on macroeconomics and finance. Chapter 1 devel-
ops a novel theory of “bubble” dynamics in a tractable noisy rational expectations model
with endogenous capital flows. I show that the unique linear partially revealing rational
expectations equilibrium features a dramatic non-fundamental rise and fall of asset prices
driven by speculation. Specifically, two layers of uncertainty—uncertainty about the funda-
mental value and uncertainty regarding the probability with which the fundamental value
is fully revealed in each period, generate the hump shape in prices; gradual capital inflows
lead to dramatic price movements and also trading frenzies. Simulation results show that
the model equilibrium can produce various realistic bubble episodes. In Chapter 2, I in-
vestigate the role of business deregulation and financial reform in both stock and credit
market in explaining the rapid growth of China in the past twenty years. To do so, I build
a dynamic general equilibrium growth model with heterogeneous consumers and firms, and
I show that structural reforms that facilitated business formation and growth lead to a
significant increase in the aggregate output. The reason is resource reallocation resulting
from stronger market competition, in particular caused by a massive influx of new firms.
Quantitative results using firm-level data find a sizable effect of these reforms, especially
through the extensive margin, and counterfactual experiments show that different policies
aiming to promote entry and post-entry growth have very distinct impacts on the economic
performance.
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Chapter 1
Price Dynamics: Differential Information
and Capital Flows
1.1 Introduction
Throughout history, asset prices sometimes appear to deviate spectacularly from their fun-
damental values. From the historic Dutch tulipmania and the South Sea Bubble to the
recent IT and housing booms, asset prices increased dramatically following a rise in in-
vestor exuberance and then collapsed as the fad receded. Explaining these phenomena and
the associated trading frenzies has long intrigued and challenged economists. Although
there is a vast literature on this subject, almost all of it has focused on either the exis-
tence of bubbles or their collapse. Very few papers seek to understand the entire dynamic
evolution of prices during these events.
Bubble episodes are usually associated with periods of high uncertainty. The supply of
rare tulip bulbs was limited and uncertain during the Dutch tulipmania of 1634-1637, and
there was great uncertainty about the value of government debt-for-equity swaps during
the South Sea Bubble in 1720. During stock market booms accompanying technological
revolutions like railroads in Britain (1830-1861) and IT in the U.S. (1995-2002), there was
substantial uncertainty about the extent to which these new technologies would change our
lives.1
In light of those historical facts, in this paper, I develop a novel theory of endogenous
asset price dynamics to show how speculation driven by uncertainty can generate plausible
bubble-like episodes. Specifically, I show how uncertainty regarding the speed at which
1See Garber (2000) pp. 39-42 and 115-120 about the Dutch tulipmania and the South Sea Bubble; see
Pástor and Veronesi (2009) for technological revolutions and stock market bubbles.
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fundamental values are revealed, together with an endogenous influx of new investors, can
lead to a unique linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium in which asset
prices rise significantly before returning to their intrinsic values.
Uncertainty about fundamental asset values, together with differential private information
and short-sale constraints, means that asset prices will reflect the marginal investor’s belief
about future optimistic investors’ beliefs. As a result, the marginal investor is willing to
pay more than his perceived fundamental value and speculative “bubbles” arise.
While this type of individual uncertainty is important, my paper focuses on a different, and
arguably more fundamental, form: uncertainty about the speed of learning. Specifically, in
my model, investors are learning about the resolution probability of fundamentals. Investors
do not know whether the uncertainty about fundamentals is going to be resolved quickly,
like with the majority of earnings announcement events, or slowly like during the IT boom.
As time goes by, if fundamentals are not fully revealed, investors begin to speculate more
and more pushing prices higher and higher.
The second novel feature in this paper is the introduction of endogenous capital inflows,
that are linked to optimal entry decisions by potential new investors. This increase in asset
demand by new investors is driven by the same uncertainty that drives up asset prices and
can greatly amplify the observed fluctuations.
In equilibrium, both uncertainty and entry determine asset prices and the magnitude of
price movements. Two layers of uncertainty generate the hump shape in prices, and capital
inflows can lead to dramatic price movements. At first, learning about how long the specu-
lation can last dominates, there are gradual capital inflows, and asset prices are pushed up
continuously—as long as the fundamental value is not fully revealed. Eventually however,
as investors’ beliefs gradually converge, asset prices fall back to their intrinsic values.
Capital inflows also cause trading frenzies. The influx of new investors bids up asset prices,
so assets change hands from existing investors to newcomers and trading volume skyrockets.
2
After entry stops, since over time, new private information has a weaker and weaker effect
on investors’ beliefs, investors adjust their holding positions less and less frequently and
thus trading volume falls gradually.
The model can produce various realistic bubble episodes. First, it is able to capture salient
features of observed bubble events, like the declining economic and policy uncertainty and
the prominent rise and fall of housing prices, the price-rent ratio, the number of first-
time buyers and existing home sales during the recent U.S. housing bubble. Second, the
model can generate bubble episodes of different shapes. By adjusting the relative rate of
information flows, the equilibrium price can exhibit a slow build-up before collapse like
during the IT boom, or a long-lasting downturn after a surge observed during the Japanese
real estate bubble in the late 1980s. Moreover, in the model, in general, the market crashes
if the fundamental value is fully revealed during the gradual learning process.
Related Literature. This paper contributes to the literature on bubbles. First, I provide
a price formation mechanism for “bubbles”. Understanding price formation is important
because only after this can we discuss policy implications. Among various explanations
for the existence of bubbles, speculative bubbles led by heterogenous beliefs and short-sale
constraints are most closely related to this paper.2 Those papers attribute heterogenous
beliefs to differences of opinion in Harrison and Kreps (1978), to heterogenous priors in
Morris (1996), or to overconfidence in Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). In this paper, it
results from differential privation information and sustained by the presence of noise traders
who prevent prices from fully revealing the fundamental value. Besides, some papers like
Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993) have shown that how bubbles can be supported in
equilibrium but not how those prices are formed. In this paper, I use a noisy rational
expectations framework to link the equilibrium price with investors’ demand schedules.
Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006) also discusses bubbles within this framework, but in their
paper, bubbles come from the higher-order uncertainty, they occur only when investors’ prior
2Examples of other explanations include rational bubbles by Tirole (1982, 1985), Blanchard and Watson
(1982), and Santos and Woodford (1997), and churning bubbles by Allen and Gorton (1993).
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mean is above the fundamental value and the equilibrium price is monotonically decreasing
over time.
My paper also explains the whole price evolution process during bubble episodes. Previous
literature focuses on bursts of bubbles or stock market crashes.3 In Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2003), the bubble grows exogenously, and investors are trying to ride the bubble and get out
of it before it bursts. In this paper, instead, price processes are endogenous, and investors
are active traders, trying to profit from price fluctuations instead of the price trend. Besides,
recently, two papers have discussed price dynamics. Pástor and Veronesi (2009) explains the
bubble-like stock price behavior. The differences from this paper are, prices there always
reflect investors’ perceived fundamental value, and it is specific to technological revolutions
in which the risk associated with some new technologies gradually change from idiosyncratic
to systematic as these technologies get widely adopted and this change depresses stock
prices. The other paper, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2013) considers a different
mechanism—social dynamics, that is, agents with tighter prior are more likely to convert
others to their beliefs. By contrast, in this paper, it is learning and endogenous capital
inflows that drive price dynamics.
In addition, this paper also adds to the literature on trading frenzies. To explain this phe-
nomenon, researchers have discussed various ways to generate strategic complementarities
in speculators’ information acquisition behavior. Examples include complementarities that
result from short trading horizons by Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1992), the riskiness of
positions by Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994), fixed information acquisition
costs by Veldkamp (2006a,b), the extra dimension of supply information by Ganguli and
Yang (2009), relative wealth concerns by Garćıa and Strobl (2011), and the feedback ef-
fect from financial markets to the real investment decision by Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and
Yuan (2013). By contrast, this paper describes trading frenzies as being from large cap-
3For example, Grossman (1988), Gennotte and Leland (1990), Romer (1993), Caplin and Leahy (1994),
Avery and Zemsky (1998), Lee (1998), Zeira (1999), Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Barlevy and Veronesi
(2003), Hong and Stein (2003) and Veldkamp (2006b).
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ital inflows, and without strategic complementarities, it features a unique linear partially
revealing equilibrium.
Moreover, this paper has several other contributions. First, to my knowledge, this is the
first theoretical paper to emphasize the importance of capital flows to bubble episodes.
Empirically, Singleton (2012) documents that investor flows had a significant impact on
crude-oil futures prices. Theoretically, Merton (1987) shows that a larger size of the investor
base can reduce the risk premium and increase the asset value, but it is not about bubbles
or dynamics of capital flows. Second, in my model, the interaction between two layers of
uncertainty leads to gradual capital inflows, which provides an alternative explanation for
the slow-moving capital (see Duffie (2010)).
Technically, my model fits within noisy rational expectations models. The differential in-
formation feature of this model is similar to the tractable dynamic framework by He and
Wang (1995).4 Based on this, I explore another layer of uncertainty and capital flows.
Structure. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I introduce the setup of the
model in Section 2 and characterize equilibrium conditions in Section 3. In Section 4, I
discuss price and trading dynamics. Section 5 shows that the model can produce various
realistic bubble episodes, and explores several other extensions and implications. Section 6
concludes.
1.2 The Model
The model embeds uncertainty about the resolution probability and endogenous capital
flows into the context of a dynamic noisy rational expectations model in which investors
have differential private information and face a short-sale constraint, and highlights the
importance of these new features to “bubble” dynamics. In the model, investors learn from
prices, so different from differences of opinion literature, they do not agree to disagree.
4The seminal work on classical noisy rational expectations models is Grossman (1976), which was later
extended by Hellwig (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981).
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Next, I introduce the setup, discuss model assumptions and define the equilibrium.
1.2.1 Setup
Consider an economy in discrete time with an infinite horizon, t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. It is populated
by a continuum of infinitely-lived risk-neutral investors with a time discount rate r.
Investment Opportunities. There are two assets. One is riskless with infinitely elastic
supply, yielding a return r. I take this asset to be the numeraire and normalize its price to
one. The other is a risky asset with a stochastic supply due to noise traders to be described
later. This risky asset pays out a stochastic dividend in each period,
Dt = rΠ + ε̃D,t
ε̃D,t ∼ N(0, r2/ρ̃D)
Since investors are risk neutral, they use the riskless interest rate r as the discount rate to
price assets. This implies that Π is the fundamental value of the risky asset. If Π is known,
asset prices are simply the fundamental value Pt = Π, and any deviation of prices from Π
will be arbitraged away in equilibrium. As a result, risk-neutral investors are indifferent
at investing in the riskless or risky asset when there is no uncertainty. In contrast, if Π is
unknown, asset prices can deviate from their fundamentals.
For investors trading the risky asset, there are two restrictions on their strategies. One is a
short-sale constraint, that is, selling assets that are not currently owned, and subsequently
repurchasing them. This assumption creates an asymmetry between buying and selling.
As a result, on average, equilibrium prices will be above the market average of investors’
beliefs.5 The other restriction is that, to prevent risk-neutral investors from taking unlimited
5All I need is the asymmetry created by costly short sales. Even if the cost is very small, with substantial
uncertainty and large capital inflows, we can still have dramatic price movements. Below is some evidence
for costly short sales in reality. For the real estate market, houses are rarely sold short. For the stock market,
examples of costs include, according to the Federal Reserve Regulation T§220.12, the margin requirement for
short sales is at least 100% of the current market value of the security; Securities and Exchange Commission
[SEC] Rule 10a-1 imposes the up-tick rule, that is, the constraint is triggered when a security’s price decreases
by 10% or more from the previous day’s closing price and is effective until the close of the next day; the
6
positions, I assume the maximum position they can hold is 1. Thus, for the risky asset, the
position investors can take is within [0, 1].
Information Structure. At the beginning of period 0, some news about the risky asset is
released. As a result, there starts to have uncertainty about its fundamental value. Assume
the uncertainty is resolved at t = T , where T can be large so that by then investors will have
learned of the fundamental value almost exactly. Investors are assumed to have a common
prior over the fundamental value, defined as
Π ∼ N(Π0, 1/ρc0)
Now I focus on those T speculative periods. At the beginning of each period, public in-
formation is released and a dividend is paid out. Besides the price and dividend history,
there can be some other pieces of public information, like media coverage. For simplicity, I
incorporate those information into the dividend, and rewrite it as6
Dt = rΠ + εD,t
εD,t ∼ N(0, r2/ρD,t)
Assume the signal precision is stochastic. In each period, it can grow at a low rate η
with probability 1 − λ, or a high rate that I put to the extreme, ∞, which implies that
the fundamental value is fully revealed immediately and the uncertainty is resolved, with
derivatives trading to mimic short sales is also costly as documented by Ofek and Richardson (2003).
6I have used the following result: given two noisy signals, x1 = θ+ ε1, x2 = θ+ ε2, where ε1 ∼ N(0, σ21),
ε2 ∼ N(0, σ22) and cov(ε1, ε2) = ρσ1σ2, they are as informative as a synthesized signal,
x3 = µx1 + (1− µ)x2 = θ + (µε1 + (1− µ)ε2)
∼ N(θ, (1− ρ
2)σ21σ
2
2
σ21 − 2ρσ1σ2 + σ22
)
where µ =
σ22−ρσ1σ2
σ21−2ρσ1σ2+σ
2
2
.
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probability λ. Specifically,
ρD,t = e
ηttρD
where
ηt =
 η with probability 1− λ+∞ with probability λ
The resolution probability λ measures the average learning speed or how long speculation
can last. With a lower λ, it is less likely that the fundamental value will be fully revealed
by dividends in each period, and thus investors expect the learning to be slower. The
motivation behind this setup is, different events have different learning speed. Some are
really fast like the majority of earnings announcement events, and some are very slow like
IT boom.
Here, I introduce the second layer of uncertainty, uncertainty about this resolution prob-
ability λ or how long speculation can last. Investors start from a common prior over λ
following Beta(β, γ) with the prior mean β/(β+γ). In each period, after observing ηt, they
use Bayes’ rule to update their belief.7 Their perceived expected resolution probability λt
is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2.1. If the uncertainty is not resolved till period m, then for 0 ≤ t ≤ m,
λt =
γ
β + γ + t+ 1
which is decreasing over time.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition is, as time goes by, if not much new information arrives, investors will become
7Here, I assume investors know η. It can also be, investors know that the uncertainty gets resolved
almost sure if the realized dividend is the same as in the last period.
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increasingly confident that uncertainty will not get resolved very soon.8
In the financial market, while some investors are trading the risky asset, others are not.9
I call the latter potential investors. In each period, after receiving the public signal, po-
tential investors make entry decisions based on the history of public information Fet =
{F0, Pτ , Dτ , ητ , Dt, ηt : 0 ≤ τ ≤ t − 1}. If they decide to enter and start to trade the risky
asset, they need to pay an entry cost e. We can think it as a one-time information acquisi-
tion cost or the opportunity cost associated with the portfolio adjustment. Denote the set
of entrants at period t as Ie,t. Right after entry, each new investor receives a private signal
S̃it = Π + ε
i
S̃,t
εi
S̃,t
∼ N(0, 1/ρS̃,t−1) (1.1)
where i ∈ Ie,t and ρS̃,t−1 is the cumulative precision of private signals received by existing
investors before period t. By this specification, the belief distribution across newcomers is
the same as existing investors, so there is no need to keep track of cohorts.
Denote the set of rational investors trading the risky asset at period t as It. Assume in each
period, each existing investor also receives a private signal, for i ∈ It,
Sit = Π + ε
i
S,t
εiS,t ∼ N(0, 1/ρS,t)
After receiving private information, investors make trading decisions based on their own
information set. By rational expectations, investors learn from their own net trades, or
8This intuition is also reflected in the conjugate prior I use. Two shape parameters β and γ represent
the number of historical realizations η and ∞ respectively, so the prior mean of the resolution probability is
γ/(β + γ). In the next period, if uncertainty is not resolved, we add 1 to β and the posterior mean of the
resolution probability decreases to γ/(β + γ + 1).
9One justification is that mutual funds have different investment objectives. According to Wiesenberger,
Strategic Insight and Lipper Objective codes, mutual funds investing in the domestic equity can be classified
by sector like technology or health stocks, by capitalization like large or small cap stocks, or by style like
growth or income stocks.
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from the current asset price because prices are informative. As a result, each investor
submits their demand schedule which depends on the current price. After that, a Walrasian
auctioneer like an electronic system sets the equilibrium price to clear the market.
The timeline for each period is summarized in Figure 1 below.
-
t receive a public signal
a dividend is paid
make entry decision
receive private signals
trade, determine price
update beliefs
t+ 1
Figure 1.1: Timeline.
For any stochastic process {Zt}, define Zt ≡ {Z0, . . . , Zt} to be the history of Zt up to and
including t. Using this notation, I define the total public information available to all the
investors to be
Fct = {F0, P t, Dt, ηt}
Similarly, define the total information available to investor i ∈ It to be
F it = {F0, P t, Dt, ηt, S
i
t}
where Sit = {S̃itie , S
i
tie
, . . . , Sit} and tie is investor i’s entry time.10
Assume the structure of the economy is common knowledge. Thus, investors are only
asymmetrically informed about the fundamental value of the risky asset.
Investors’ Problem. Investors behave competitively. Given the initial wealth and asset
prices, investors make consumption, investment, and also entry decisions if they are potential
investors, to maximize their discounted lifetime utility from consumption. For potential
10For investors trading the risky asset before the announcement of news, by default, their entry time is
period 0.
10
investors, they have the following problem:
max
c,x,tie
E0[
∞∑
t=0
1
(1 + r)t
cit|F0] (1.2)
s.t.
W it = W
i
t−1(1 + r)− cit − 1{t=tie}e for 0 ≤ t ≤ t
i
e
W it = W
i
t−1(1 + r) + x
i
t−1(Pt +Dt − Pt−1(1 + r))− cit for t > tie
xit ∈ [0, 1], 0 ≤ tie ≤ T − 1
W i0 is given, non-Ponzi condition
where W it , c
i
t and x
i
t are investor i’s wealth, consumption and position on the risky asset
at period t respectively, conditional on the history which for simplicity I do not write out.
After the entry, investors’ return from investment consists of two parts, the riskless interest
rate and the excess return from trading the risky asset. In addition, I impose a non-Ponzi
condition to preclude the possibility that investors keep rolling over their debt forever.
For the entry decision, since it is based only on the public information, all the potential
investors will make the same decision. Thus, from now on, I omit its superscript i. Besides,
I restrict the entry decision to be made during those T speculative periods, because trading
the risky asset makes a difference only when there is uncertainty about its fundamental
value. Moreover, investors can always be inactive if they do not perceive any profitable
trading opportunities, so given the entry cost, entry is a one-time decision for them.
Some investors are initially randomly endowed with the risky asset. They have the same
problem except that they do not need to make entry decisions. For them, te = 0.
Capital Flows. Capital flows in this paper are defined as the measure of new rational
investors trading the risky asset in each period. Although by this definition it is more
accurate to call them investor flows, I choose capital flows because the intuition holds in a
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general sense.
The total measure of investors trading the risky asset ñt, consists of two parts, rational
investors with measure nt and noise traders with measure εn,t. As the standard noise
trading story, the asset supply available in the market is 1 − εn,t with εn,t held by noise
traders. εn,t and thus the asset supply are stochastic and unobservable.
The specification for noise traders is as follows. For tractability, instead of imposing a
stochastic structure directly on εn,t, I introduce a new variable q̃t and assume
q̃t = qt + εq,t (1.3)
εq,t ∼ N(0, 1/ρq)
where
q̃t = Φ
−1(
ñt − 1
nt
), qt = Φ
−1(1− 1
nt
)
Here, nt is strictly increasing in qt, so throughout the paper, I will use nt and qt inter-
changeably. In fact, q̃t measures how many units of standard deviation the equilibrium
price is above the market average of investors’ beliefs. The intuition for this specification
is explained in Appendix B.
Assume there are unlimited potential investors. This and the assumption that risk-neutral
investors have access to the same information before their entry indicate that the measure
of rational investors trading the risky asset should satisfy the free-entry condition, that is,
in each period investors keep entering till entry is no longer profitable. Denote investors’
expected discounted lifetime utility by following an entry rule t̃ as Ṽ (t̃), given asset prices
{Pt} and the measure of rational investors trading the risky asset {nt}. Thus, the optimal
entry decision is the optimal stopping time maximizing Ṽ (t̃), and I denote the set of opti-
mal entry decisions as Te. Additionally, denote investors’ maximized expected discounted
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lifetime utility from only trading the riskless asset as Ṽ0. Then the free-entry condition is
given by
Ṽ (te) = Ṽ0, ∀te ∈ Te (1.4)
Moreover, in equilibrium, we also need a consistency condition, that is, whenever there
are capital inflows, investors must be willing to enter at that point. Mathematically, this
requires that, given the probability space (Ω,FeT−1, P ) in which given the relevant state
variables (Π, εD,t, εq,t, ηt), Ω = R
2T+1 × ΛT with Λ = {η,+∞}, for ω ∈ Ω,
{t : nt(w) > nt−1(w), 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1} ∈ Te(w) (a.s.) (1.5)
Here it is abuse of notation but for simplicity, Te(w) ≡ {te(w)}, i.e., Te(w) is the set of the
optimal entry time te(w) for w ∈ Ω.
Discussion. The discussion below is on modeling strategies. First, the fundamental value
Π is assumed to be constant, but it is easy to introduce time-varying fundamentals. One
such example is Wang (1993) which considers a time-varying growth rate of dividends.
Besides, it is also straightforward to extend the model to study independent multi-asset
markets.
Second, I synthesize all the public information into dividends. The only change resulting
from this simplification is that as fundamentals, dividends are less volatile and realized
dividends are affected by other public signals. However, this change does not affect investors’
trading decision and the equilibrium asset price. This is because, since investors are risk
neutral, when making trading decisions, they only consider expected future dividends.
Third, the specification for the precision of public signals is parsimonious, but rich enough
to include some standard cases discussed in the literature. Specifically, ηt = 0 corresponds
to the constant flow of information, ηt = −∞ implies the concentrated flow of information,
and ηt = η > 0 captures the speedup in information flows, which can be caused by the
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increasing media coverage over time and also more time to revise previous reports.
Fourth, notice that nt is not included in the public information set, because as we will see
later, it contains no extra information.
Fifth, I assume that the precision of private signals received by new investors equals the
cumulative precision of historical private signals received by existing investors. Under this
assumption, among newcomers, some are optimistic and some are pessimistic. What I need
for capital inflows is at every period there is an inflow of optimistic investors which will put
more upward pressure on the asset price. In light of this, there is no loss in intuition from
the specification I use for ρS̃,t. Moreover, I choose this specific form for tractability. On one
hand, there is no need to keep track of cohorts entering at different periods; on the other
hand, as we will see later, this set-up can avoid the extreme complexity caused by investors’
differential beliefs about future capital flows.
At last, the precision of the private signal received by each existing investor can be time
varying. This includes two standard cases in the literature, a concentrated flow of informa-
tion, ρS,0 > 0 and ρS,t = 0 for t > 0, and a constant flow of information, ρS,t = ρS > 0 for
all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
1.2.2 Equilibrium
Notation. Denote the expectation on the fundamentals based on the public information
and each existing investor’s own information set F it , i ∈ It as
Ect [Π] = E[Π|Fct ], Eit [Π] = E[Π|F it ]
Denote each existing investor’s own expectation on the next-period price as
Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1] = E[Pt+1 +Dt+1|F it ]
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and the market average of their expectation as
Ēt[Pt+1 +Dt+1] =
∫
i∈It
Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1]di
Besides, denote the belief precision based on the public information and each existing in-
vestor’s own information set as
ρct =
1
var(Π|Fct )
, ρt =
1
var(Π|F it )
where i ∈ It. By symmetry, var(Π|F it ) should be the same for all the existing investors, so
I omit the superscript i.
In addition, due to differential private information, investors have different forecasts on
future prices. Thus, denote the standard deviation of the forecast mean across investors as
σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1) = σ(E
i
t [Pt+1 +Dt+1])
At last, let I be the set of all the investors.
Equilibrium. State variables in this economy are (Π, εD,t, εq,t, ηt, (ε
i
S,t)i∈It , (ε
i
S̃,t
)i∈Ie,t).
Since the noise in investors’ private signals will be smoothed out in the aggregation, prices
only depend on FPt = {Π, εD,t, εq,t, ηt}.
11 For simplicity, assume all the shocks to the
economy are independent of each other.
We can define a rational expectations equilibrium as follows:
Definition A rational expectations equilibrium consists of asset prices {Pt}, the measure
of rational investors trading the risky asset {nt}, investors’ consumption decision {cit} and
trading strategy {xit} adapted to {F it} for i ∈ I, potential investors’ entry decision te which
11Technical problems exist for the validity of the law of large numbers with a continuum of private signals
(see Judd (1985)). Several papers have discussed possible remedies (examples include Feldman and Gilles
(1985), Bewley (1986), Uhlig (1996) and Al-Najjar (2004)). Here following Feldman and Gilles (1985), we
can relax the independence assumption of private signals across investors to get no aggregate uncertainty.
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is an optimal stopping time of {Fet }, and investors’ beliefs about the fundamental value and
the resolution probability, {Ect [Π], ρct , λt, (Eit [Π], ρt)i∈It}, s.t.
• Given {Pt} and {nt}, investors’ choice ({cit, xit}, te)i∈I is the solution to their utility
maximization problem (2.1).
• Given {Pt} and {nt}, investors’ beliefs {Ect [Π], ρct , λt, (Eit [Π], ρt)i∈It} are updated ac-
cording to Bayesian rules.
• The measure of existing rational investors {nt} satisfies the free-entry condition (2.2)
and the consistency condition (2.3).
• The asset market clears:12
∫
i∈It
xitdi = 1− εn,t
1.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium
Since investors are risk neutral, they make consumption and investment decisions separately
and their objective function is equivalent to maximizing the present value of their wealth
at the end of the speculative period. This implies a simple optimal trading strategy, that
is, they are willing to hold the risky asset as long as its expected excess return is positive.
Proposition 1.3.1. The optimal trading strategy is given by, for te ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
xit =
 1 if E
i
t [Pt+1 +Dt+1] ≥ (1 + r)Pt
0 o.t.w.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This optimal trading strategy can be implemented by limit orders. The current price is
12Throughout this paper, I always mean almost surely or almost everywhere.
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Hold
Not Hold
Pt
Eit [Pt+1+Dt+1]
1+r
P̄ it
45◦
Figure 1.2: Demonstration of the optimal trading strategy. The intersection be-
tween the price target Eit [Pt+1 + Dt+1]/(1 + r) shown by the solid line and the 45-degree
line defines a price threshold P̄ it . Investors are willing to hold the asset iff Pt ≤ P̄ it , which
is a limit order.
informative but also noisy, so conditional on the current price, investors only partially
adjust their price target Eit [Pt+1 + Dt+1]/(1 + r). This implies the existence of a price
threshold. Investors are willing to hold the asset if and only if the current price is below
this price threshold. Specifically, if investors hold one unit of asset, they want to sell it
whenever the current price is above the price threshold, and vice versa. This is exactly a
limit order. The intuition for this result is demonstrated in Figure 2.2.
In this paper, I focus on the linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium. In
my model, there is a fully revealing equilibrium in which the equilibrium price equals the
fundamental value and investors are indifferent between buying and selling. However, it is
hard to justify how the information is incorporated into the price when investors’ demand
schedules contain no information. In light of this, I study the partially revealing equilibrium.
Besides, for tractability, I restrict to the linear equilibrium in which prices are linear in state
variables and qt which is equivalent to the measure of rational investors trading the risky
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asset. In the linear equilibrium, first-order expectations are enough to solve the complexity
of the higher-order uncertainty from the beauty-contest metaphor in Keynes (1936).
The equilibrium asset price is determined by supply and demand. It is characterized by the
following proposition.
Proposition 1.3.2. In a linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium, at
period t, if the uncertainty is resolved, Pt = Π, otherwise,
(1) the equilibrium price has the following form:
Pt = (1− pΠ,t)Ect [Π] + pΠ,tΠ +
T−1∑
m=t
pq,tmqm + pε,tεq,t (1.6)
(2) the belief about the fundamental value based on the public information is updated by
Ect [Π] =
ρct−1
ρct
Ect−1[Π] +
ρD,t
ρct
1
r
Dt +
ρq/µ
2
t
ρct
ξt
where ξt = Π + µtεq,t with µt = pε,t/pΠ,t, and
ρct = ρ
c
t−1 + ρD,t +
ρq
µ2t
each existing investor’s belief about the fundamental value based on their own infor-
mation set is updated according to
Eit [Π] = (1− αt)Ect [Π] + αt
1
t+ 1
t∑
m=0
Sim (1.7)
with
αt =
ρS̃,t
ρct + ρS̃,t
and
ρt = ρt−1 + ρD,t +
ρq
µ2t
+ ρS,t
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Proof. See Appendix A.
The equilibrium price function consists of three components. The first is the fundamental
belief component (1− pΠ,t)Ect [Π] + pΠ,tΠ. It is a weighted average of two parts—the belief
based on the public information and the fundamental value reflecting the aggregate private
information. The last component is a noise term pε,tεq,t led by noise traders and it prevents
prices from fully revealing the fundamental value.
The second component
∑T−1
m=t pq,tmqm is driven by the supply and demand force, and it is
the key to non-fundamental price movements in this model. With short-sale constraints,
asset prices reflect the marginal investor’ forecast about future marginal investors’ price
forecasts. In general, marginal investors are optimistic. Thus, prices are above the market
average of investors’ beliefs about the fundamental value, and their distance is captured by
this second component in the price function.
As will be shown later, in equilibrium, it is common knowledge that investors have the
same forecast on rational capital flows. For now, let us take it as given and discuss the price
formation mechanism.
Investors hold different beliefs about the fundamental value. This heterogeneity is caused
by differential private information. Investors with a history of good private signals are
optimistic among all the investors, and vice versa. Moreover, the heterogeneity is sustained
by the presence of noise traders which prevents prices from fully revealing the fundamental
value and thus preserves asymmetric information across investors. In each period, investors
try to extract the information about the fundamental value from all the noisy information
they have. For instance, taking the price function (2.4) as given, we have the information
contained in the price to be
ξt = Π + µtεq,t
with
µt = pε,t/pΠ,t
19
If the current price is higher than expected, investors will ascribe this difference partly to
the possibility that the fundamental value is higher than their expectation, and partly to
the high demand from too much noise trading. If the price is very informative about the
fundamental value, investors will give a high credit to the asset value.
With heterogenous beliefs about the fundamental value, investors differ in the price they
are willing to pay for the risky asset and they submit different limit orders. Optimistic
investors have high price thresholds for their limit orders relative to pessimistic investors.
This generates a downward-sloping demand curve, and the equilibrium price is set such that
the asset demand equals the supply of that period.
The equilibrium price reflects the marginal investor’s price target. The marginal investor is
the least optimistic investor holding the asset currently. Since private signals are assumed
to follow a normal distribution, from the equilibrium price function (2.4), across investors,
their price target Eit [Pt+1 + Dt+1]/(1 + r) also follows a normal distribution N(Ēt(Pt+1 +
Dt+1)/(1 + r), σ
2
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1)/(1 + r)
2). By the market clearing condition,
nt(1− Φ(
Pt − Ēt[Pt+1 +Dt+1]/(1 + r)
σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)/(1 + r)
)) = 1− εn,t
using the specification for noise traders (2.5), we have the equilibrium price to be determined
by the marginal investor’s price target,
Pt =
Ēt[Pt+1 +Dt+1]
1 + r
+
σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)
1 + r
(qt + εq,t)
which on average is above the market average of investors’ price targets Ēt[Pt+1+Dt+1]/(1+
r). The intuition for the price determination is illustrated in Figure 1.3. In a dynamic
context, prices in general reflect current optimistic investors’s beliefs about future prices
which further reflect future optimistic investors’ beliefs on even future prices, and so on...
This is where the non-fundamental price components or “bubbles” come from.
The equilibrium price depends on how many rational investors are trading the risky asset,
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Eit [Pt+1+Dt+1]
1+r
Ēt[Pt+1+Dt+1]
1+r
Pt
1− εn,t
1
1+rσt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)(qt + εq,t)
Figure 1.3: Demonstration of the equilibrium price. Given the asset supply 1− εn,t,
with short-sale constraints, the equilibrium price is above investors’ average price target by
qt + εq,t units of investors’ belief dispersion.
which is determined by the free-entry condition and characterized in the proposition below:
Proposition 1.3.3. At period t, the equilibrium measure of rational investors trading the
risky asset nt or equivalently qt satisfies:
(1) It is nondecreasing over time.
(2) If there are capital inflows,
Vt ≥ e (1.8)
where
Vt =
T−1∑
m=t
(
1
1 + r
)m−t(Πm−1j=t (1− λj))vm
is the discounted expected excess returns if entering at period t.
(3) If there are capital inflows at both period t and t+ 1,
vt = (1−
1− λt
1 + r
)e (1.9)
where vt is the expected excess return from trading the risky asset at period t if the
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uncertainty is not resolved, conditional on Fem, ∀0 ≤ m ≤ t, and it is given by
vt = σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)(
√
1 +
1
ρq
φ(− qt√
1 + 1ρq
)− qtΦ(−
qt√
1 + 1ρq
))
with σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1) = (1 + r)pΠ,t
√
1
ρS̃,t
, and φ(·) and Φ(·) are the PDF and CDF of
the standard normal distribution respectively.
(4) If 1 − (1 − λt)/(1 + r) is decreasing faster than σt(Pt+1 + Dt+1) over time, we have
gradual inflows of investors till Vt < e.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The measure of rational investors trading the risky asset is nondecreasing over time. This
is because, investors can always choose not to hold any risky assets if they do not perceive
any profitable opportunities, and given the costly entry, those investors have no incentive
to exit. In Section 5, I discuss the possibility of exit and its implications.
It is common knowledge that investors have the same perfect foresight about future cap-
ital flows and capital flows in each period are deterministic. Given the equilibrium price
function, the expected excess return is given by
Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1]− (1 + r)Pt = (1 + r)pΠ,t
1
t+ 1
t∑
m=0
εiS,m − σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)(qt + εq,t)
which depends on the noise in private signals and also the measure of noise traders. Since
potential investors have access to only public information before entry, so their ex-ante
expected excess returns in each period are: first, identical across potential investors; second,
unrelated with the fundamental value, so private information does not help existing investors
forecast capital flows, and all the investors, including existing and potential investors, have
the same perfect forecast; third, independent with the history of public information till that
period, so capital flows in each period are deterministic.
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Equilibrium capital flows satisfy condition (1.8) and (1.9). First, in each period, if potential
investors are willing to enter, their discounted expected excess returns from trading the
risky asset after entry must be enough to cover entry cost, i.e., Vt ≥ e. Second, potential
investors also need to decide when to enter, now or next period. With capital inflows at
two consecutive periods, potential investors must be indifferent, that is, the benefit from
entering now which is the flow payoff from speculation, should equal the benefit from waiting
which is the entry cost that can be saved if uncertainty gets resolved in the next period.
Here, the flow payoff from speculation is increasing in investors’ belief dispersion. This is
because with a larger belief dispersion, asset prices are more volatile and thus expected
speculation profits are higher. Besides, this flow payoff is decreasing in the current measure
of rational investors trading the risky asset. The reason is that, with more investors, asset
prices will be bid up higher, and given future asset prices, this squeezes out speculation
profits.
Two layers of uncertainty determine equilibrium capital flows. This is shown by the indif-
ference condition (1.9). Mathematically, if 1 − (1 − λt)/(1 + r) which captures investors’
expected resolution probability for the next period, is decreasing faster than investors’
belief dispersion σt(Pt+1 + Dt+1), qt will increase which means capital inflows. Intuitive-
ly, equilibrium capital flows depend on the relative speed of learning about two layers of
uncertainty—the fundamental value and the resolution probability. On one hand, if the
fundamental value is not fully revealed over time, investors will become increasingly confi-
dent that uncertainty will not get resolved very soon, speculation will last long, and total
expected speculation profits will be higher. This creates an incentive for entry. On the other
hand, as learning proceeds, investors’ beliefs gradually converge. This reduces speculation
profits, so investors have less incentive to enter. These two forces work in opposite ways and
equilibrium capital flows depend on which force is stronger. If learning about the resolution
probability is faster, there are inflows of investors; otherwise, we have no capital flows.
Without strategic complementarities, given exogenous information flows, we have the fol-
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lowing result for the equilibrium existence and uniqueness:
Proposition 1.3.4. There exists one and only one linear partially revealing rational expec-
tations equilibrium in this economy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The basic idea for this result is as follows. First, exogenous information flows uniquely
determine the coefficients in the equilibrium price function. Second, given those price
coefficients, since two layers of uncertainty have opposite effects on entry decisions, they
uniquely determine equilibrium capital flows. At last, equilibrium capital flows and price
coefficients together determine the unique equilibrium price function.
1.4 Price and Trading Dynamics
1.4.1 Capital flows
Proposition 1.4.1. Under certain regularity conditions (A1)-(A3) stated in Appendix A.6,
we have gradual inflows of investors first and they stop till any of the conditions (1.8) and
(1.9) is violated.
Proof. See Appendix A.
From now on, all the results are discussed under those regularity conditions. As explained
before, capital flows depend on expected speculation profits which are determined by the
relative speed of two layers of learning. Those regularity conditions guarantee that learning
about the resolution probability is faster than the convergence of investors’ beliefs initially
and slower later. Thus, at the beginning, period after period, investors expect a longer
speculation process and higher expected speculation profits, and this brings gradual capital
inflows; however at the same time, investors are learning about the fundamental value which
leads to declining profits eventually, so capital inflows stop after some periods.
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Table 1 lists the value of baseline parameters, which will be used for all the numerical
results unless otherwise specified. Here I consider a case in which public information comes
faster and faster as suggested by η > 0 and private information arrives in constant flows,
ρS,t = ρS .
13 This is only for numerical illustrations, as all the analytical results hold in
general cases. A numerical example for capital flows is shown in Figure 1.4.
Table 1.1: Baseline Parameter Values.
Assigned parameters Value
precision of the prior ρc0 35
precision of private signals ρS 0.05
precision of noise traders ρq 0.05
precision of dividends ρD 1.6× 10−4
growth rate of public information η 0.2
mean of the prior about the fundamental value Π0 0.4
fundamental value Π 0.4
prior parameter I of the resolution probability β 1
prior parameter II of the resolution probability γ 9
entry cost e 0.01
riskless interest rate r 0.004
number of speculative periods T 75
1.4.2 Price dynamics
Denote the average observed price path if the fundamental value is not fully revealed till
period T as {P̄t}Tt=0. Given the equilibrium price function, price movements in {P̄t}Tt=0 are
described by the proposition below:
13There is one issue with constant flows of private information. Under the common prior assumption,
the weight on the private information and thus investors’ belief dispersion increase first. As a result, prices
go up initially with only uncertainty about the fundamental value. However, this will not happen for other
situations like concentrated flows of private information.
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Figure 1.4: The measure of rational investors trading the risky asset indicated
by {qt}.
Proposition 1.4.2. If the uncertainty is not resolved at t + 1, the price movement in the
average observed price path is
4P̄t = P̄t+1 − P̄t
=
1
1 + r
(
T−1∑
m=t+1
(1− 1− λt
1 + r
)(
m∏
j=t+2
1− λj
1 + r
)σm(Pm+1 +Dm+1)qm︸ ︷︷ ︸
4n1,t
− σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)qt︸ ︷︷ ︸
4n2,t
)
(1) 4n1,t > 0, is caused by unexpected capital flows; 4n2,t < 0, is by short-sale con-
straints.
(2) There exists t̃ s.t. 0 ≤ t̃ < T−1, 4Pt ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t < t̃ and 4Pt < 0 for t̃ ≤ t ≤ T−1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The average observed price movement is driven by 4n1,t and 4n2,t. Positive 4n1,t is
caused by unexpected capital flows. To see this, notice that in each period, with some
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probability, uncertainty will be resolved and the price will not depend on capital flows any
more. Thus, when making trading decisions, investors only take expected future capital
flows into account. In the next period, if uncertainty is not resolved, capital flows will be
higher than expected. This difference measures unexpected capital flows at period t, given
by 4n1,t, which pushes up the price as long as uncertainty is not resolved. In contrast with
this positive 4n1,t, 4n2,t is negative, due to short-sale constraints. In the last section, we
have shown that with short-sale constraints and differential private information, the price
reflects current optimistic investors’ beliefs about future optimistic investors’ beliefs, so on
average, the market average of investors’ price forecasts for the next period is below the
current price, and this difference is captured by 4n2,t.
Two layers of uncertainty and capital inflows drive non-fundamental price movements
through these two terms. Uncertainty about the fundamental value is related with the
negative term 4n2,t. As learning proceeds, investors’ beliefs gradually converge, and thus
eventually, the price goes back to the fundamental value. In contrast, uncertainty about the
resolution probability is associated with the positive term 4n1,t. Initially, expected capital
inflows are very small because investors are worried that uncertainty will get resolved very
soon. As a result, the asset price is only slightly above the fundamental value. After one
period, uncertainty is not resolved, so the price goes up because of large unexpected capital
inflows. In this way, as speculation continues period after period, unexpected capital inflows
push up the asset price continuously. Meanwhile, since investors become increasingly confi-
dent that the resolution probability is low, the size of unexpected capital inflows decreases
over time. Thus after some point, this positive force 4n1,t is dominated by the negative
force 4n2,t, and the price falls. On top of these two layers of uncertainty, capital inflows
amplify price movements, since price movements in the above proposition are proportional
to {qt}T−1t=0 . The intuition is, with capital inflows, more investors are trading the risky asset,
and they push the asset price further above the fundamental value.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the result for price dynamics. The red horizontal line is the funda-
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Figure 1.5: The average observed price path. Normalized by the fundamental value.
mental value. Two layers of uncertainty lead to a slightly hump-shaped price pattern, as
displayed by the dashed line. On top of this, with capital inflows, price movements are
dramatic, which look like a realistic bubble episode.
While the average observed price path is smooth, realized price paths are fluctuating, as
shown in the top panel of Figure 1.6. I simulate 1000 price paths and plot the top and
bottom one percentile of price realizations in each period. From the figure, we can see that
among realized price paths, this rise-and-fall pattern is in general preserved.
Investors are active traders even when the price trend is going down. The average observed
price path is given by
P̄t = Π0 +
T−1∑
m=t
pq,tmqm
This indicates that on average, asset prices are above the fundamental value by
∑T−1
m=t pq,tmqm
and it is common knowledge. Thus, all the investors understand this rise-and-fall price pat-
tern. However, investors are still actively trading even when the price trend is going down,
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Figure 1.6: Simulated price paths. Normalized by the fundamental value. The top
panel shows the average, as well as the top and bottom 1% realizations of simulated 1000
price paths. The bottom panel shows one particular realized price path and the corre-
sponding expected price Eit [Pt+1 + Dt+1]/(1 + r) of investors with private signals ε
i
S,t = 0,
0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
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because instead of the price trend, by making use of their private information, they are
trying to profit from price fluctuations caused by noise traders.
One example of the trading process is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 1.6, in which
I show one realized price path and the corresponding price target Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1]/(1 + r)
from investors with private signals εiS,t = 0 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. If the realized price
is higher than their price target, investors believe that it is because of the high demand
from too many noise traders today, and in the next period, the price will go down. Thus,
they choose not to hold the asset, that is, if they already have one share, they sell it, and
if not, they do not buy. By the same logic, if the realized price is lower than their price
target, they choose to hold. By following this buy-at-low and sell-at-high short-term trading
strategy, investors can profit from price fluctuations, and this is why they still trade during
the downturn.
Moreover, in Figure 1.6, we can see that speculation profits diminish as investors’ beliefs
converge over time. Also in this example, the conditional volatility of prices is higher during
the downturn, because with an increasing ρD,t, prices become very sensitive to public news.
Comparative Statics. Results for comparative statics are shown in Figure 1.7. Within
the parameters that have been tried, I have the following findings:
If the prior precision ρc0 increases, price movements are less dramatic due to less uncertainty.
Besides, asset prices go up for a longer time, because the convergence rate of investors’ beliefs
in each period is lower with a higher prior precision. This is also true for concentrated flows
of private information.
If the measure of noise traders is less volatile, i.e., ρq is higher, we have less striking price
movements and also an earlier price reversal. This is because prices are more informative
now. As a result, investors’ beliefs converge faster, which leads to these two results. Similar
results hold for a higher precision of public signals η and ρD.
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Figure 1.7: Comparative statics.
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With a higher precision of private signals ρS , investors put more weight on private infor-
mation and thus their initial forecast dispersion is larger. As a result, we have more capital
inflows. This and a higher initial forecast dispersion push up prices to a larger extent.
Meanwhile, investors’ beliefs converge faster, so the price reversal comes earlier.
If the prior mean of the resolution probability is lower, investors are more aggressive in
the beginning, and this brings more capital inflows. As a result, initial prices are higher
and prices continue to go up to a larger extent. However, the price reversal is earlier as
learning about the resolution probability is slower in each period. This is shown by two
cases (β, γ) = (1, 9) and (β, γ) = (9, 1). For cases (β, γ) = (1, 9) and (β, γ) = (5, 45), the
latter one implies a slower learning of the resolution probability. Thus, it generates fewer
capital inflows, and price movements are less prominent.
As we raise the entry cost e, we have less capital inflows in each period. This leads to less
striking price movements and lower initial prices.
These results on comparative statics have several cross-sectional implications on asset prices.
First, results on the initial uncertainty indicate that compared with income stocks, growth
stocks experience more dramatic price movements on average. Second, by results on the
precision of public signals, it is more likely to observe striking price movements in stocks with
low analyst coverage. Third, although not shown in Figure 1.7, by the linearity property of
equilibrium prices, price movements of small firms tend to be more prominent. Moreover,
if we think of the entry cost as the downpayment for home purchases, the result shows that
intuitively, raising downpayment requirements help curb speculation.
1.4.3 Bubbles
Given non-fundamental price movements, can we call those price paths bubbles?
Previous literature has defined bubbles in different ways. Among which, speculative bubbles
are the closest to my paper.14 To quote Allen and Gorton (1993), a bubble is defined to
14See, e.g., Harrison and Kreps (1978), Tirole (1982), Allen and Gorton (1993), Allen, Morris, and
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be a price path supported by the trading of agents who are “willing to pay more for [the
security] than they would pay if obliged to hold it [to horizon]”. Another way to state this
definition is that every investor knows that the price is above their perceived fundamental
value.
In this model, speculators exist in equilibrium, but during each period not all of the investors
are speculators. The difference between the price and investors’ perceived fundamental value
is
Pt − Eit [Π] =
T−1∑
m=t+1
pq,tmqm + (Pt −
Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1]
1 + r
) + (1−
pΠ,t
αt
)(Ect [Π]− Eit [Π]) (1.10)
Among investors who are willing to hold the asset, Pt − E
i
t [Pt+1+Dt+1]
1+r ≤ 0. For extremely
optimistic investors with very high beliefs on the fundamental value, Pt < E
i
t [Π], i.e., the
asset price is below their perceived asset value. Thus, investors holding the asset can be
divided into two groups, speculators and extremely optimistic investors. The fraction of
speculators in each period is depicted in Figure 1.8. The figures shows that during each
period except T − 1, there are some speculators among investors holding the risky asset.
Since the essence of speculative bubbles is speculation, given the existence of speculators, I
will treat price paths here as bubbles. Specifically, in this paper, a bubble arises when the
marginal investor who is the least optimistic investor holding the risky asset with Eit [Pt+1 +
Dt+1]/(1 + r) = Pt, is a speculator, that is, knows that the price is above his perceived
fundamental value. The intuition follows from the price formation process we have discussed
in the last section. Rational investors are willing to pay more because they expect that
future prices, reflecting future optimistic investors’ beliefs, will be even higher.15
We have several findings in Figure 1.8. First, it shows that most investors are speculators
Postlewaite (1993), Morris (1996), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).
15The weight on private information is different in the equilibrium price function and investors’ beliefs
about the fundamental value. This adds some noise to the bubble definition here, as can be seen from the
third term in equation (1.10) which is on average negative. However, usually this third term is very small,
and apart from it, the results using my definition of bubbles are clear.
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Figure 1.8: The fraction of speculators. This figure shows the fraction of speculators
out of all the investors and among asset holders.
during each period. In addition, no speculators hold the risky asset during the last specu-
lative period T − 1, thus there are no bubbles in that period. This is the result shown in
Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993). The reason is, investors know that the asset price
in the next period is going to be the fundamental value and thus they are not willing to
pay a price higher than their perceived fundamental value. However, bubbles arise when we
go backward one more period. In period T − 2, investors have one trading opportunity to
resale the asset to even more optimistic investors at period T − 1. This creates speculation
and thus bubbles.
Bubbles in this paper are different from the bubbles generated by the higher-order uncer-
tainty in Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006). In their paper, when forecasting prices, investors
need to forecast other investors’ forecasts, so they put more weight on public information.
This result indicates that when the fundamental value is below the prior mean, prices are
above the market average of investors’ beliefs about the asset value, because investors be-
lieve that other investors have even higher beliefs. As a result, this higher-order uncertainty
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leads to bubbles.
1.4.4 Trading volume
As traditional noisy rational expectations models, in contrast with the no-trade theorem
by Milgrom and Stokey (1982), the presence of noise traders brings about trade by itself
and also speculative trade because the information in the price does not “swamp” private
information. To compute trading volume, we can keep track of the selling side. In this
model, the trading volume is given by
TVt = nt−1Pr(E
i
t−1[Pt +Dt] ≥ (1 + r)Pt−1, Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1] < (1 + r)Pt) + (εn,t−1 − εn,t)+
Although it contains some information about the measure of noise traders, it can be treated
as another noisy signal about the fundamental value like the price, and there is no reason to
believe that including this signal will change the mechanism. Because of this and also the
computation complexity, I assume investors do not observe trading volume in the model as
previous literature.
For tractability, I study the case ρS,t = ρS . It can be shown that
TVt = nt−1
∫ ∞
qt−1+εq,t−1
Φ(
√
t+ 1(qt + εq,t)−
√
ty)φ(y)dy + (εn,t−1 − εn,t)+
It consists of two parts, speculative trading and noise trading. This paper focuses on
the speculative trading whose volume is measured by the equilibrium trading volume with
εn,t = 0, ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.16
Proposition 1.4.3. In period t, if the uncertainty is not resolved, the equilibrium volume
of speculative trading is
TV t = nt−1
∫ ∞
qt−1
Φ(
√
t+ 1qt −
√
ty)φ(y)dy (1.11)
16To be precise, it is the median path of the volume of speculative trading.
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where Φ(·) and φ(·) are the CDF and PDF of the standard normal distribution respectively.
With sufficient capital inflows, it increases over time, and it falls after capital inflows stop.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for the dynamics of trading volume is as follows. In each period, the selling
decision is induced by two factors. One is that capital inflows bring more investors, especially
optimistic investors, to the market, and they bid up asset prices. The other one is that
investors may become pessimistic if they receive a bad private signal. The first factor tends
to increase trading volume as assets change hands from existing investors to newcomers. For
the second factor, as learning proceeds, investors’ beliefs are less and less affected by new
private information, and thus trading volume decreases over time. Therefore, with sufficient
capital inflows, the first factor dominates and trading volume trends up. But after capital
inflows stop, only the second factor works, so trading volume falls gradually.
1.4.5 An example: U.S. housing bubble
After characterizing price and trading dynamics, in this section, I compare model implica-
tions with a realistic example, the recent U.S. housing bubble. The sample period I pick is
May 2003 when the housing price started to surge, to May 2009 when it reached a low.
Uncertainty. An important factor driving fluctuations in housing prices is the land price
(Davis and Heathcote (2007)), which moves together with macroeconomic variables over
business cycles (see Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013)). Thus, it is reasonable to believe that
uncertainty about the housing value is closely related with the economic uncertainty. In
panel (a) of Figure 1.10, I show two related indices for the economic uncertainty. One is
the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index constructed by Scott Baker, Nicholas Bloom and
Steven J. Davis, and the other is the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX). The panel (a) of Figure
1.9 displays the uncertainty index in the model, defined as σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1).
As is shown in the figure, the uncertainty is in general declining, which is consistent with the
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Figure 1.9: The U.S. housing bubble: model. Panel (a) plots the uncertainty measure
in the model σt(Pt+1 + Dt+1). Panel (b) shows the measure of first-time buyers (averaged
over 8000 times of simulation). Panel (c) displays asset prices. Since the fundamental value
is a constant, it also measures the trend of the price-rent ratio. Panel (d) shows the turnover
rate. Given that the average asset supply is one, it is also the volume of speculative trading.
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Figure 1.10: The U.S. housing bubble: data. Panel (a) displays two uncertainty
indicators, the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index constructed by Scott Baker, Nicholas
Bloom and Steven J. Davis, and the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) from WRDS. Panel (b)
shows the measure of first-time buyers. The data (with 12-month simple moving average) is
calculated using the share of first-time buyers and existing home sales provided by National
Association of Realtors. Panel (c) plots housing prices and the price-rent ratio. The housing
price is measured by S&P Case-Shiller 20-city home price index released by S&P Dow Jones
Indices LLC. The price-rent ratio is constructed using the price index and the rent measured
by CPI: owners’ equivalent rent of residences from Bureau of Labor Statistics. The initial
value of the constructed ratio is normalized to be the same as in the model. Panel (d) shows
the turnover rate calculated by existing home sales from National Association of Realtors
over owner occupied housing units from U.S. Department of Commerce: Census Bureau,
with 12-month simple moving average.
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model. Right after the IT bubble burst in 2000, the U.S. economy slipped into a recession
in 2001. Together with 9/11 and the 2nd Gulf War, it brought about very high uncertainty
about the economic prospect at that time. Later, as the economy gradually recovered, the
uncertainty went down over time till it soared again in 2008 because of financial crisis.
Capital Flows. In the model, investors gradually flow into the risky asset sector, and
inflows stop at some point. However, by the property of learning, the speed of capital
inflows is so fast in the beginning that trading volume shoots up immediately and keeps
declining after that. Since in reality, it is reasonable that the information diffusion takes
time and the entry cost is decreasing over time due to easier information acquisition and a
smaller opportunity cost for portfolio adjustment, to remedy the above issue, I introduce
an exogenous cap on capital flows over time, which takes the following parsimonious form:
q̄t = −0.0018t2 + 0.21t+ 0.5
The linear term captures constant capital inflows while the quadratic term guarantees an
upper limit. Notice that this constraint only changes the speed of capital inflows.
In the data, an indicator for capital flows is the number of first-time buyers. I get a rough
estimate using the annual share of first-time buyers provided by National Association of
Realtors. Assume each buyer only trades once per period and the monthly share is the
same throughout the year. Thus, multiplying the share with the existing home sales gives
us the number of first-time buyers. Panel (b) of Figure 1.10 shows the data after 12-month
simple moving average. We can see that the number remained high till September 2005 and
then fell quickly before it rebounded in 2009. The model prediction shown in panel (b) of
Figure 1.9 fits this trend broadly. According to the same mechanism for trading volume, in
the model, the measure of first-time buyers trends up and then down.
Prices. By Proposition 4.2, the price soars first and falls later. This is consistent with the
data, S&P Case-Shiller 20-city home price index released by S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC..
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The housing price in the U.S. grew steadily through 1990s. But after 2001-2002 recession,
it surged and peaked in early 2006. After faltering for a few months, it started to decline.
Panel (c) of Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 show that the model can match the data very well.
Price-rent Ratios. I construct the price-rent ratio from the data in the following way. The
price is measured by the S&P Case-Shiller 20-city home price index, and I use the CPI for
all urban consumers: owners’ equivalent rent of residences from Bureau of Labor Statistics
as a proxy for the rent.17 Although the price-rent ratio obtained in this way cannot give
us the right number, it captures the dynamics of the price-rent ratio well, which is what
I need. To make a comparison, I normalize the constructed price-rent ratio so it has the
same initial value as my model predictions.
Panel (c) of Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 show the result. In the data, the rent has remained
fairly stable all the time, so the price-rent ratio follows price pattern very closely. It went
up by about 40% when the housing price peaked and then dropped to its initial level, which
is an indication of speculative bubbles.18 In the model, given the constant fundamental
value, the price-rent ratio has exactly the same dynamics as prices. As can be seen from
the figure, the model captures the trend in the data.
Turnover Rate/Trading Volume. In the model, given that the average asset supply is
one, the turnover rate of the risky asset equals its trading volume. With the cap on capital
inflows, the trading volume or the turnover rate has a rise-and-fall pattern, as displayed
in panel (d) of Figure 1.9. Two kinks happen when the cap constraint becomes unbinding
and when capital inflows stop.19 In panel (d) of Figure 1.10, taking the increasing housing
supply into consideration, I plot the turnover rate calculated by existing home sales from
National Association of Realtors over owner occupied housing units from U.S. Department
of Commerce: Census Bureau, after 12-month simple moving average. From the figure, we
17Results are very similar using other measures like the CPI for all urban consumers: rent of primary
residence.
18See Shiller (2005) in which he shows one feature of those episodes of speculative bubbles in the stock
market is incredibly high price-earnings ratios.
19Kinks happen because the slope of capital flows is not continuous in the discrete time model.
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can see that it shows the same pattern of trading frenzies.
1.5 Implications and Extensions
1.5.1 Bubbles of various shapes
Underneath the up-and-down pattern during bubble episodes, prices evolved in their own
ways. As shown in Figure 1.11, for some events like the IT bubble, it took a long time for
prices to build up before they plummeted, and for some other events like the Japanese real
estate bubble in the late 1980s, prices skyrocketed before entering a long-lasting downturn.
In the model, the main force to drive these two different patterns is the flow rate of infor-
mation. With a lower ρD and a higher η, which implies a lower level but faster growth in
information flows over time, prices evolve like those during the IT bubble. The reason is
that, a lower ρD indicates slower convergence of investors’ beliefs initially and thus prices
can go up for a longer time, and a higher η means that investors’ beliefs converge much
faster at a later stage which drives down prices quickly. By contrast, price dynamics during
the Japanese real estate bubble can occur with a higher ρD and a lower η.
In reality, the slow build-up of prices during the IT bubble may be caused by high uncertain-
ty and slow learning about the value of IT, and one possible explanation for the long-term
downturn in Japan is the delayed policy response like reducing non-performing loans.
In addition, the model can produce exogenous price crashes. In each period, the fundamental
value may get fully revealed with certain probability. If this happens, prices will go back
to the fundamental value immediately and this looks like a crash, as shown by Figure 1.12.
In fact, the crash mechanism here works in a more general environment. It can also be
the possibility of government intervention which ends speculation in each period. This is
not rare in real life. For instance, according to the description of the South Sea Bubble
in Garber (2000), at the end of August 1720, South Sea share prices collapsed due to a
liquidity crisis brought by the enforcement of the Bubble Act which precluded the growth
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Figure 1.11: Bubbles of different shapes. Parameters that drive these two different
shapes are the level parameter ρD and the growth rate η of the precision of public signals.
I set ρD = 1.6×10−5 and η = 0.25 for the IT bubble, and ρD = 25×1.6×10−4 and η = 0.1
for the Japanese real estate bubble. Besides, by comparing prices in the initial period and
the last period, I set the fundamental value Π = 0.32 and its prior mean Π0 = 0.2 for the
IT bubble, and Π = 0.15 and Π0 = 0.4 for the Japanese real estate bubble. In addition, to
match the magnitude of price movements, I choose the initial uncertainty ρ0 = 20 for both
episodes, the entry cost e = 0.02 for the IT bubble, and e = 0.04 and the precision of private
signals ρS = 0.2 for the Japanese real estate bubble. In the data, the price index for the
IT bubble is S&P 500 Index, and for the Japanese real estate bubble, it is the urban land
price of nationwide: commercial, from Japan Statistical Yearbook 2014, Statistics Bureau,
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Japan.
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Figure 1.12: Market crashes.
of South Sea company’s competitors and thus drove down stock prices of those competitors.
1.5.2 Capital outflows
In the model, there are no capital outflows. In this subsection, I consider an exogenous
capital outflows case. In each period, assume 5% of rational investors will exit and stop
trading the risky asset. From Figure 1.13 which plots capital flows and the average observed
price path, we can see that the main difference is that the price is declining faster now
because of capital outflows. This dramatic rise-and-fall pattern is preserved, due to two
reasons: first, instead of entry, expected speculation profits lead to net entry; second,
investors know the resolution possibilities, so this additional feature, exogenous capital
outflows if uncertainty is not resolved in the distant future, will not have a large impact on
investors’ trading decision and thus prices today.
Another concern with capital outflows is that they reflect pessimistic investors’ beliefs and
thus contain information about the fundamental value. In general, we can treat capital
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Figure 1.13: Exogenous capital outflows: flows and the average observed price
path. Assume 5% exogenous capital outflows in each period. The left panel displays the
measure of existing rational investors indicated by qt. The right panel shows the average
observed price path normalized by the fundamental value.
outflows as another noisy signal like prices.20 There is no reason to believe that it will
change model results, but technically it will be much more involved.
1.5.3 Endogenous information acquisition
The model can be justified in an endogenous information acquisition framework. Take the
entry cost e as a one-time information acquisition cost and assume an upper bound for the
signal precision that can be acquired. It is obvious that in equilibrium investors will choose
this upper bound, which is equivalent to exogenous information flows. The rest results carry
over into this setup.
Admittedly, multi-equilibria might arise in different endogenous information acquisition
settings. Previous literature has a lot of discussion on the equilibrium uniqueness and
results varies with the setup.21 Similarly, it is not robust in this model. Consider one
20Noises can be from risky outside production possibilities as in Wang (1990).
21Examples include, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) gets the uniqueness result through information substi-
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example in which the information acquisition cost is increasing in the signal precision to be
acquired. With endogenous capital flows, we may get two equilibria, a high signal precision
with a small amount of rational investors, and a low signal precision with a large amount
of rational investors, or even we can get a continuum of equilibria.
1.5.4 Negative shocks: speculation on ST stocks in China
One important implication of this model is that uncertainty drives speculation and thus
non-fundamental price movements. For stock market booms during the technological revo-
lutions, they were from good news with uncertainty about the future of those technologies.
In this subsection, I provide an example for bad news with uncertainty.
On April 22, 1998, to enhance listed companies’ governance practice and protect investors’
interests, Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China introduced a new rule, by
which, they would give special treatment to the stocks of listed companies with abnormal
financial conditions like shareholders’ equity is lower than the registered capital in the last
fiscal year. Those stocks are called ST stocks as an abbreviation thereafter, and within
one year if their conditions are not improved, they may be suspended for trading and even
delisted. For those stocks, surprisingly, investors react enthusiastically, and stock prices go
up insanely compared with their negative net profits sometimes.
This phenomenon can be explained by this model, speculation driven by uncertainty. With
ST designation, stocks have more uncertainty than before, especially when they start to
restructure. One such example is Jiangxi Changjiu Biochemical Industry Company.22 It
received special treatment on April 26, 2011 due to negative net profits in two consecutive
fiscal years. After that, from time to time, there were rumors about the possibility that
another company with rare earth resources as its main business, Ganzhou Rare Earth Group
tutability, Barlevy and Veronesi (2000) and Chamley (2008) provide a complementarity example in which
more information makes prices less informative by introducing the correlation between fundamentals and the
noise, and also Veldkamp (2006b) gets strategic complementarities through fixed costs in the information
production.
22Data can be obtained from CSMAR database. The stock code (STKCD) is 600228.
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Company, would go public through reverse merger with Changjiu company. In response, on
December 28, 2012, Changjiu company made a public announcement to negate the rumor
but not decisively. This tone ignited a speculative wave among investors. The stock price
went up from 14.95 RMB to almost 40 RMB in June 2013, and later gradually went down
to 29.02 RMB on November 4, 2013 right before Weihua company unexpectedly declared
that the rare earth resources company would corporate with them. Since that day, the stock
price of Changjiu company plummeted, and after dropping consecutively for seven days, it
fell to 13.89 RMB. During the period from December 28, 2012 to November 4, 2013, the
average annual turnover rate of Changjiu stock was 864.84% while for Shanghai A share
market, it was only 8.53%.23
1.5.5 Mutual fund flows: “performance chasers”
Interestingly, investors act like return chasers in this model. They flock to assets with high
past returns. This is because large inflows of investors and the resulting high returns are
two features of speculative fads driven by uncertainty. The superior high past returns of
assets indicate that those assets are more likely to have high uncertainty which further
implies higher expected capital flows in the future. Thus, those rational investors turn out
to look like return chasers. As an illustration, I simulate 5000 stocks for 50 periods, and
Table 2 shows regression results using the simulated data. As predicted, the period t return
has positive and statistically significant effects on capital flows in period t + 1, but when
controlling for the period t uncertainty, flows become less sensitive to past returns, and
when including a fourth-degree polynomial of the period t uncertainty index, the estimate
becomes statistically insignificant.
This result can be related to the well-documented flow-performance relationship for mu-
tual funds (see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998)). Mutual
funds pick stocks, so their returns are likely to be positively correlated with stock returns.
23The turnover rate is computed as, the value of shares traded divided by the market value of tradable
shares.
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Table 1.2: The Flow-Performance Relationship
The dependent variable is capital flows calculated as the number of new optimistic rational investors
who expect to trade immediately. It is zero if uncertainty gets resolved and 1− nt−1Φ(−qt) if not.
Uncertainty is measured as 0.1σt(Pt+1 + Dt+1)/(1 − (1 − λt)/(1 + r)). Simulated data consists of
5000 assets for 50 periods (with the first 50 periods as the “burn-in” period). In each period, 50
different assets are hit by independent uncertainty shocks randomly. The parameters are listed in
Table 1 with ρD = 1.6× 10−3, η = 0, (β, γ) = (4, 6).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lag return (0.01%) 10.543∗∗∗ 2.266∗∗∗ -0.002 10.543∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.276) (0.115) (0.002) (1.892) (0.015)
Uncertainty 4.415∗∗∗ 25.876∗∗∗ 25.876∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.350)
4th poly. of uncertainty No No Yes No Yes
Cluster-Robust SE (on asset) No No No Yes Yes
Asset fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 240100 240100 240100 240100 240100
adj. R2 0.06 0.84 1.00 0.06 1.00
Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Meanwhile, investors pick funds, so mutual fund flows can be an indicator for capital flows
to assets. By the above argument, uncertainty drives fund flows to chase performance.
This can be an alternative explanation in addition to the existing theories like investors are
learning about managerial skills from the past performance by Berk and Green (2004).
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have developed a novel theory of “bubble” dynamics—the dramatic non-
fundamental rise and fall of asset prices and the associated trading frenzies. As in the
literature, speculative “bubbles” arise because of heterogeneous beliefs and short-sale con-
straints. However in this paper, heterogeneous beliefs are led by differential private in-
formation and sustained by the presence of noise traders which prevents prices from fully
revealing the fundamental value and preserves asymmetric information across investors. For
the price formation, uncertainty about assets’ fundamental values, together with short-sale
constraints, means that asset prices reflect the marginal investor’ belief about future opti-
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mistic investors’ beliefs, and as a result, the marginal investor is willing to pay more than
his perceived fundamental value. This is where speculative “bubbles” come from.
For the price evolution, two layers of uncertainty—uncertainty about the fundamental value
and uncertainty regarding the probability with which the fundamental value is fully revealed
in each period, generate the hump shape in prices, and gradual capital inflows bring dramatic
price movements. Moreover, capital inflows also lead to trading frenzies. Numerically,
simulation results show that the model equilibrium can produce various realistic bubble
episodes. The importance of uncertainty and capital flows demonstrated in this paper
sheds light on the future policy analysis on bubble events.
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Chapter 2
Financial Frictions, Entry and Growth: A
Study of China
2.1 Introduction
During the past twenty years, we have witnessed the incredibly rapid growth of China. The
average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita between 1990 and 2010 was 9.5% while
within the same period the average global growth was 3.6% and between 1950 and 1990 the
Chinese economy grew at only 4.3% per year.1 Understanding this striking phenomenon is
undoubtedly an important growth experiment, and it has attracted a great deal of attention.
In particular, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) have
focused on the role of the reduced misallocation in China.
While misallocation is measured among incumbent firms, this paper emphasizes the reallo-
cation induced by entry. Specifically, the paper investigates the role of structural reforms—
business deregulation and financial reform in both credit and stock market, in explaining
this rapid growth, especially through the entry channel. Furthermore, with heterogenous
firms, the model is used to evaluate policies targeting particular groups of firms, and the
results show that these policies such as tax deduction and favorable loan terms on small
firms can have strikingly different impacts on the aggregate TFP and output.
The paper is motivated by the growing experience of China, as shown in Figure 1 panel
(i)-(iii). Since the market-oriented reform of China was extended to the whole country in
1The global growth is computed using world gross domestic product in constant prices from the IMF
World Economic Outlook Database (October 2014). Data for the Chinese economy is the purchasing power
parity converted GDP per capita (chain series) for China at 2005 international dollars per person from the
Penn World Table 7.1. During the 1980s, the economy experienced a boom and bust, but since 1990, the
economy has remained at a high growth stage.
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Figure 2.1: Motivation Facts of the Chinese Economy. Data for the costs of business
start-up procedures (% of GNI per capita) and domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)
is from the World Bank. Data for the number of public firms and manufacturers is from the
China Statistical Yearbook (2014). Firm-level productivity is calculated by y/(kαlγ) using
Annual Surveys of Industrial Production for China 1998-2007.
1992, entry barriers in terms of costs of business start-up procedures have been reduced
dramatically. Meanwhile, stock market is growing rapidly after it was established at the
end of 1990, as reflected in the climbing number of public firms. Credit market indicated
by domestic credit to private sector (%GDP) has also been improved gradually. Based on
these facts, I construct a structural model to assess the effects of reforms including business
deregulation in the form of declining entry costs, the establishment of stock market, and
the improvement in the credit market reflected in the relaxation of credit constraints.
The paper stresses the importance of entry. Structural reforms lead to a massive influx of
new firms and thus a higher business density. As a result, the market competition becomes
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fiercer and more inefficient firms have to exit. This induces resources to be reallocated
from inefficient to efficient firms and thus results in a higher aggregate output. The model
implication on productivity improvement at the extensive margin is supported by the firm-
level data in China. As shown in Figure 1 panel (iv)-(vi), at the post-reform stage, we
have observed a sharp increase in the number of manufacturers and in the mean time, a
gradual improvement in the bottom percentiles of the productivity distribution for all the
manufacturers but not among all the surviving manufacturers.
To quantify the contribution of different aspects of reforms to the economic growth in
China through this entry channel, a tractable growth model integrating costly entry, credit
frictions, IPO and dynamics of heterogenous firms and consumers is presented. The model
is close to Aiyagari (1994) on the consumer side in which individuals can work subject to
idiosyncratic labor income shocks or they can set up their own business, while on the firm
side, the model is built on Hopenhayn (1992) in which firms differ in their productivity and
net worth, and operate with credit constraints and IPO options.
Policy parameters in the model are identified as follows. Entry barriers in the form of entry
costs are closely associated with business density. The fixed cost of IPO determines the
fraction of firms going public. Lastly, the tightness of credit constraints is linked with the
domestic credit to private sector (%GDP).
Quantitative results show a very sizable effect for these reforms. In total the model can
explain 46.6% of the increase in real GDP per capita of China from 1990 to 2010. Interest-
ingly, business deregulation alone explains 17.2% while financial reform accounts for 9.3%
of the GDP change, suggesting a multiplicative effect of those reforms. Moreover, within
the model, 22.3% of the output change is from the intensive margin and 77.7% is through
the extensive entry and exit margin, which indicates the importance of the entry channel.
The model is then used to evaluate policies targeting small firms. Specifically, I compare
tax deductions with favorable loan terms. Both policies aim to promote entry and post-
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entry growth. However, since firms grouped by net worth and productivity receive different
benefits from two policy tools, it is hard to access which policy is more effective analytically.
In light of this, making use of this model, I conduct a numerical policy experiment and find
that tax deduction has worked better for the Chinese economy.
This paper contributes to the literature on the Chinese economy. Many researchers have
conducted growth accounting exercises for China (examples include Zheng and Hu (2009),
Bosworth and Collins (2008), Perkins and Rawski (2008) and Brandt and Zhu (2009)) and
found that aggregate TFP and capital stock explain the growth of real GDP per capita
half by half. Different from the accounting approach, this paper tries to provide a micro-
foundation for the rapid growth. Two papers are closely related to this paper. One is Hsieh
and Klenow (2009). They empirically document the decline in the degree of misallocation
among incumbent firms over time. The other one is Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011)
which models the gradual reallocation between two sectors. As discussed above, both pa-
pers focus on the misallocation within existing enterprises, and this paper emphasizes the
reallocation caused by entry. Moreover, by modeling the behavior of individual firms, the
framework can be used to evaluate firm-specific policies.
This paper also adds to the literature on entry barriers and the market selection. Jovanovic
(1982) explicitly models the selection and associated industry dynamics, and Hopenhayn
(1992) discusses the relationship between entry costs and the selection. More recently,
some studies make cross country comparisons about entry costs and aggregate economic
performance using structural models (e.g., Barseghyan and DiCecio (2009), Boedo and
Mukoyama (2012)), and some other papers focus on specific forms of entry costs like the
difficulty of imitating incumbents by entrants in Luttmer (2007). Among these papers,
Aghion, Fally, and Scarpetta (2007) conducts a cross country empirical study and finds that
financial system is important to business creation. This result provides additional empirical
support for this paper. Besides, Acemoglu, Akcigit, Bloom, and Kerr (2013) considers a
different selection process on innovative capacities and the resulting reallocation of skilled
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labor. Relative to the literature, this paper focuses on the growth of one specific country
and investigates the impact of various types of entry barriers.
In addition, the vast literature on financial development and economic development is closely
related to this paper. See Levine (2005), Banerjee and Duflo (2005) and Matsuyama (2007)
for excellent surveys. In general, for the quantitatively oriented literature, the mechanism
can be divided into extensive margin and intensive margin.2 This paper focuses on the
extensive margin, i.e., entry.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the institution background.
Section 3 describes the model and characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 conducts quan-
titative analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Institution Background
During the past twenty years, the Chinese government has taken out the market-oriented
reform step by step and costs of business start-ups have decreased gradually. Before 1992,
state-owned enterprises were the major market participants. However, after realizing the
importance of the market, during the 1980s, the government carried out some market reform
experiments in a few special areas. Later, the reform was extended to the whole country
in 1992, and in 1997, the government officially endorsed the role of private economy and
proposed to create equal opportunities for all types of firms to compete in the market. In
2003, the law for small and medium-sized enterprises became effective. The law explicitly
states that the government should provide various services and benefits like information to
these firms, and also the local government should simplify the register process. In 2004,
the government further abolished all the administrative licenses except 500 items related
to national security, natural resources and so on. In 2008, the new law for the corporate
income tax reduces the tax rate of small-scale enterprises with low profits to 20% while the
standard tax rate is 25%. All those steps show the decreasing trend for the entry cost. By
2Some recent examples include Giné and Townsend (2004), Jeong and Townsend (2007), Amaral and
Quintin (2010), Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2013) and Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011).
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a direct indicator from the World Bank, in China, the cost of business start-up procedures
has decreased from 17.8% of GNI per capita in 2003 to 4.5% of GNI per capita in 2010.
Along with business deregulation, the financial sector has also experienced fundamental
changes. For the stock market, nowadays there are two main stock exchanges in mainland
China, Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Both of them were founded at the end of
1990, and afterwards grow very quickly, with the total number of listed companies increasing
from the initial 10 to 2343 in 2011 and the annual raised capital from the initial 500 million
yuan to 581.42 billion yuan in 2011. Moreover, according to the World Federation of
Exchanges, in 2012, Shanghai Stock Exchange was the world’s 7th largest stock market
with the domestic market capitalization at $2.5 trillion. Besides, in the credit market,
the bankruptcy efficiency has been improved a lot. According to the World Bank (2001),
during the 1980s, when firms went bankruptcy, creditors’ rights were always violated for
the sake of settling affected workers. Although a Trial Bankruptcy Law for State-Owned
Enterprises, which became effective in 1988, separated secured assets from the estate, the
Capital Structure Optimization Program Circular No.492 of 1996 made even mortgaged
land use rights available for worker claims. Nowadays, the situation has changed with the
development of the social security and pension system. In China, till 1990, the employee
pension was mainly provided by enterprises. However, the transition towards the social
security system started from 1991, and after a 6-year trial process in some provinces from
2001 to 2006, the government started to expand the social security system to the whole
country. As a result, now creditors’ rights are guaranteed by the new enterprise bankruptcy
law which became effective in June 2007. As an indicator for financial development, domestic
credit to private sector in China has increased from 78% of GDP in 1989 to 130% in 2010,
according to World Development Indicators from the World Bank.
2.3 Model
The model is built on Aiyagari (1994) and Hopenhayn (1992) with financial frictions. In
the model, on the one hand, individuals differ in their wealth and they can set up their own
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businesses; on the other hand, firms have heterogenous productivity and net worth, they
produce subject to financial constraints, they launch IPO when they become sufficiently
productive, and they exit when they cannot make money any more. Within this environ-
ment, I study the effect of structural reforms including business deregulation by lowering
entry costs, the improvement in the credit market through relaxing the collateral constraint,
and the development of stock market in the form of an IPO option.
Next, I introduce a benchmark model first. After that, I discuss the compatibility between
some salient features of the Chinese economy and the model framework.
2.3.1 Consumers
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived individuals with measure L.3
They maximize the expected life-time utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−σt − 1
1− σ
(2.1)
where ct is consumption in period t and β is the time discount factor.
In each period, individuals work, save and consume. They can be either workers (µt = 0)
or entrepreneurs (µt = 1). If an individual is a worker in period t − 1, he can continue to
work and earn wage income wt in period t, or he can set up his own business and become
an entrepreneur. In the latter case, he needs to pay an entry cost cewt, and in the next
period, the firm starts to produce after its initial productivity is drawn from an exogenous
distribution. Details about firms are provided in the next section 3.2. The worker’s budget
constraint is given by
ct + at+1 ≤ 1{µt=1}(−cewt) + 1{µt=0}wtyt + (1 + rt)at (2.2)
Here I impose a borrowing constraint at+1 ≥ 0. In addition, as in Aiyagari (1994), workers
3The phenomenon of migration from rural to urban areas will be considered in section 4.4 Robustness
Check.
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suffer from a labor income shock yt which follows
log(yt) = ρ log(yt−1) + εt
where ρ ∈ [0, 1) and εt ∼ N(0, σ2y).
For an entrepreneur, in period t, he can operate the business and collect the profit piet (zt, at)
where zt measures the firm’s productivity. If not, he can close the firm and in the next pe-
riod switch back to be a worker. More importantly, he has one more option provided by a
new element I consider here, the stock market. Assume there is a fixed cost of IPO cpwt
which captures all the size-irrelevant costs such as expenses on external auditors and regis-
tration/filing costs. Under this specification, the entrepreneur will choose to take the firm
public if the business is sufficiently profitable. Since through public trading, the ownership
and thus the idiosyncratic risk can be perfectly diversified among consumers, the firm’s
value from the standpoint of investors vft (zt) is simply the discounted value of all the future
profits. Assume going public also incurs a transaction cost which is φp fraction of the firm’s
value. This φp captures the costs netted against proceeds like the underwriter’s discount. In
summary, by taking the firm public, the entrepreneur receives revenue (1−φp)vft (zt)−cpwt.
Given these options, an entrepreneur’s budget constraint is
ct + at+1 ≤ 1{µt=1}π
e
t (at, zt) + 1{µt=0}max((1− φp)v
f
t (zt)− cpwt, 0) + (1 + rt)at (2.3)
2.3.2 Firms
In equilibrium, there is a continuum of firms. They are private firms when operated by
entrepreneurs, and become public firms after their IPO. Firms use the following technology
yt = (Z̄tzt)k
α
t (lt − l̄)γ
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where Z̄t = Z̄0(1+g)
t is the technology frontier moving forward at an exogenous rate g, and
zt measures the individual firm’s relative position with respect to the technology frontier,
which takes value within (0, 1]. A higher zt indicates that the firm is in a more profitable
position relative to other firms. In light of this, to be rigorous, zt will be called relative
productivity from now on. Besides, in the production function, l̄ is the overhead labor
cost. For private firms, assume l̄e = 0, while for public firms, considering the cost of being
IPO like the need to develop external reporting, I assume l̄f > 0. In addition, assume the
technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale, i.e., 0 < α, γ < 1 and α+ γ < 1.
In each period, after the realization of individual productivity, firms make production
decisions—how much capital to rent and how many workers to employ. As in Buera and
Shin (2013), Moll (2014) and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011), I assume that the
capital that can be rented by private firms is limited by a collateral constraint kt ≤ λat,
where λ ≥ 1 and at is the entrepreneur’s wealth. This constraint can be derived from a
model of limited contract enforcement. Here λ captures the frictions in the credit market.
An increase in λ indicates the development of credit market, and λ = ∞ corresponds to a
perfect credit market. Denote πet (zt) as private firms’ profit function derived from the static
profit maximizing problem,
πet (at, zt) = max
0≤kt≤λat,lt≥l̄
(Z̄tzt)k
α
t (lt − l̄)γ − (rt + δ)kt − wtlt (2.4)
and ket (at, zt), l
e
t (at, zt) are policy functions of capital and labor respectively. For public
firms, since they could raise funds through equity issuance, I assume their capital rental is
not restricted. Their profit function is thus
πft (zt) = max
kt≥0,lt≥l̄
(Z̄tzt)k
α
t (lt − l̄)γ − (rt + δ)kt − wtlt (2.5)
and kft (zt), l
f
t (zt) are corresponding policy functions. Simple algebra shows that profits are
decreasing in factor prices rt and wt. This indicates that higher factor prices led by fiercer
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competition will squeeze firms’ profits, and thus more firms will exit.
Assume firms draw their initial relative productivity from an exogenous distribution G(z).
Besides, using an exogenous version of productivity evolution process in Pakes and McGuire
(1994) and Ericson and Pakes (1995), I assume
zt+1 =

zt(1 + g)
nu with prob pu(zt)
zt with prob 1− pu(zt)− pd(zt)
zt/(1 + g)
nd with prob pd(zt)
where in general pu(zt) < pd(zt) which captures the intuition that deterioration is easier
than improvement and also is consistent with the Chinese data. Under this setting, firms’
productivity is improving from time to time, but their relative position in the whole pro-
ductivity ladder is in general falling gradually. As a result, firms exit eventually when they
lag too far behind the technology frontier.
While entrepreneurs make exit decisions for their own private firms, public firms exit when-
ever their value falls below zero. This implies an exit threshold of productivity. I denote it
as zft . Given the stochastic discounting factor Mt+1 = 1/(1 + rt+1), public firms’ problem
can be written in the following recursive form,
vft (zt) = π
f
t (zt) +Mt+1Et max{v
f
t+1(zt+1), 0} (2.6)
2.3.3 Financial Institutions
In the credit market, assume there are competitive financial intermediaries which take
deposits from consumers and rent out capital to firms. In return, firms pay back at a rental
rate rt + δ, and after the deduction of depreciation rate δ, consumers receive an interest
rate rt on their deposits. As described above, the friction in this market is that firms face
a credit constraint of which the tightness is measured by λ.
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Besides, with a stock market, firms can go public after paying IPO costs consisting of a
fixed cost cpwt and also a φp fraction of the firm value. In spite of these costs, IPO is
still attractive. This is because it enables risk-averse entrepreneurs to sell the ownership
to the public who can bear more risk by diversification and also take back the investment
like entry cost which is beneficial given the borrowing constraint. Moreover, another reason
is that as an additional funding channel, IPO relaxes the firm’s credit constraint and thus
increases the firm value.
2.3.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, individuals are heterogenous in their wealth a due to different history paths
of their career choices, labor income shocks and realizations of firm productivity, and firms
differ in their relative productivity z and for private firms/entrepreneurs also in net worth
or wealth a. The competitive equilibrium can be defined as follows.
Definition Given the initial distributions, a competitive equilibrium consists of allocations
{cwt (a, y), awt+1(a, y), µwt (a, y), cet (a, z), aet+1(a, z), µet (a, z), ket (a, z), let (a, z), k
f
t (z), l
f
t (z), z
f
t }∞t=0,
prices {wt, rt}∞t=0, and distributions {Fwt (a, y), F et (a, z), F
f
t (z)}∞t=0 such that
1. Given {wt, rt}∞t=0, {cwt (a, y), awt+1(a, y), µwt (a, y), cet (a, z), aet+1(a, z), µet (a, z)}∞t=0 solves
individuals’ problems (2.1)-(2.3).
2. Given {wt, rt}∞t=0, {ket (a, z), let (a, z), k
f
t (z), l
f
t (z)}∞t=0 solves firms’ problems (2.4) and
(2.5), and {zft }∞t=0 is given by v
f
t (z
f
t ) = 0.
3. Markets clear for any t ≥ 0.
(a) Labor market clears:
L =
∫
a≥0
∫
y≥0
µwt (a, y)cedF
w
t (a, y) +
∫
a≥0
∫
(1−φp)vft (z)≥cpwt
(1− µet (a, z))cpdF et (a, z)
+
∫
a≥0
∫
z∈(0,1]
µet (a, z)(l
e
t (a, z) + 1)dF
e
t (a, z) +
∫
z∈[zft ,1]
lft (z)dF
f
t (z)
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(b) Capital market clears:
∫
a≥0
∫
y≥0
adFwt (a, y) +
∫
a≥0
∫
z∈(0,1]
adF et (a, z)
=
∫
a≥0
∫
z∈(0,1]
µet (a, z)k
e
t (a, z)dF
e
t (a, z) +
∫
z∈[zft ,1]
kft (z)dF
f
t (z)
4. Distributions {Fwt (a), F et (a, z), F
f
t (z)}∞t=0 follow the law of motion:
(a) Distribution of workers:
Fwt+1(a, y) =
∫
ã≥0
∫
ỹ≥0
1{µwt (ã,ỹ)=0,awt+1(ã,ỹ)≤a}p(y|ỹ)dF
w
t (ã, ỹ)
+
∫
ã≥0
∫
z∈(0,1]
1{µet (ã,z)=0,aet+1(ã,z)≤a}f(y)dF
e
t (ã, z)
(b) Distribution of entrepreneurs/private firms:
F et+1(a, z) =
∫
ã≥0
∫
y≥0
∫
z̃∈(0,1]
1{µwt (ã,y)=1,awt+1(ã,y)≤a,zt+1(z̃)≤z}dG(z̃)dF
w
t (ã, y)
+
∫
ã≥0
∫
z̃∈(0,1]
1{µet (ã,z̃)=1,aet+1(ã,z̃)≤a,zt+1(z̃)≤z}dF
e
t (ã, z̃)
(c) Distribution of public firms:
F ft+1(z) =
∫
z̃∈(0,1]
1{zt+1(z̃)≤z}dF
f
t (z̃)
+
∫
a≥0
∫
(1−φp)vft (z̃)≥cpwt
1{µet (a,z̃)=0,zt+1(z̃)≤z}dF
e
t (a, z̃)
Notice that distributions are cumulative functions of frequency not density.
We can further define a balanced growth path (BGP). Along BGP, the interest rate is a
constant, denoted as r. Besides, the wage rate, the profits, the value of public firms, the
consumption and the wealth are all growing at the same rate (1 + g)
1
1−α . In addition, given
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the utility function, I can define the effective time discount factor as β̃ = β(1 + g)
1−σ
1−α .
The optimization problem for workers now can be written in the following stationary and
recursive form (all the variables except r and z are detrended),
vw(a, y) = max
µ∈{0,1},c,a′≥0
{ c
1−σ
1− σ
+ β̃(1{µ=0}Ev
w(a′, y′) + 1{µ=1}Ev
e(a′, z′))}
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ 1{µ=0}wy + 1{µ=1}(−cew) + (1 + r)(1 + g)−
1
1−αa
where the initial relative productivity z′ is drawn from G(z′).
Correspondingly, entrepreneurs’ problem is given by
ve(a, z) = max
µ∈{0,1},c,a′≥0
{ c
1−σ
1− σ
+ β̃(1{µ=0}Ev
w(a′, y′) + 1{µ=1}Ev
e(a′, z′))}
subject to
c+ a′ ≤ 1{µ=0}max((1− φp)vf (z)− cpw, 0) + 1{µ=1}πe(a, z) + (1 + r)(1 + g)−
1
1−αa
where by redefining the stochastic discount factor M̃ = (1 + g)
1
1−α /(1 + r), we have the
value of public firms to be
vf (z) = πf (z) + M̃Emax{vf (z′), 0}
2.3.5 Discussion
In this paper, I take the year 1992 as a turning point and consider structural reforms in two
aspects. One is business deregulation, that is, the Chinese government started to allow and
promote the growth of private economy from 1992. This change is reflected in the decline
of entry cost ce in the model. The other aspect is financial reform. Stock market was first
established at the end of 1990 in China. Thus at the pre-reform stage, transaction cost of
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IPO φp is set to be 1, and the reform features a drop in φp. Besides stock market, credit
market has also improved, which is characterized by the relaxation of collateral constraint,
that is, an increase in λ.
One phenomenon accompanying structural reforms in China is the massive migration from
rural to urban areas. I take into account this change in the size of labor force for manufac-
turing sector in the quantitative analysis by assuming the measure of individuals after the
reform is L′ > L. As will be discussed later, it is a linear amplification effect.
It is well documented that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less efficient than private
enterprises (PEs).4 This paper can endogenize the TFP discrepancy in the following way.
Before 1992, SOEs were in the majority in China. However private economy has been
expanding rapidly since 1992. As Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) documents, the
employment share of domestic private enterprises (DPEs) out of DPEs and SOEs has in-
creased from 4% in 1998 to 56% in 2007. Given these facts, we can take all the firms before
the reform as SOEs and all the entrants as PEs after the reform. Thus, SOEs are less
productive because they are older and grew in a less competitive environment.
Moreover, as discussed in Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011), SOEs have much better
access to bank loans than PEs. Although in the model SOEs receive no preferential treat-
ment, the result here is a conservative estimate on the impact of those reforms. The reason
is that, before the reform, the economy with a mixture of SOEs and PEs with differential
policies is less productive than the economy with only one type of firm, while during the
post-reform stage, the difference has no effect since nearly all the firms will be private firms
along the new BGP given almost all the entrants are PEs.
4For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
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2.4 Quantitative Analysis
2.4.1 Parameterization
I parameterize the model to match some salient features of the Chinese economy.
The preference parameter σ is set to be standard 1.5. The time discount rate is chosen so
that the equilibrium interest rate is standard 4.5%. Besides, the technology frontier expands
at the rate g = 2% which matches the TFP growth rate of the U.S. economy. The capital
depreciation rate is δ = 0.1. In addition, since functionally overhead labor cost incurred for
public firms serves as a per-period fixed cost and thus the stationary distribution of public
firms is well-defined, I choose it to be l̄f = 0.5. Results under different l̄f will be shown
later as a robustness check. Moreover, the initial technology frontier Z̄0 and the measure
of workers L are scale parameters, so I set Z̄0 to be 0.8 and L to be 1,000. As discussed
above, due to labor migration, the size of labor force in the industrial sector has increased
a lot after the reform. According to the China Statistical Yearbook, the employment size
in the industrial sector is 1365 in 2010 if it is 1000 in 1991 right before the reform.5 Thus,
I set L′ = 1365.
For the production function, the output elasticity with respect to labor, taken from the
careful study of Young (2003) on the labor income share, is on average 0.46 from 1978-
1995.6 The span of control, in particular for firms whose credit constraints are non-binding,
can be calculated by
α+ γ = 1− revenue from principal business− cost of principal business
revenue from principal business
Using the data from the China Statistical Yearbook on aggregate statistics for large and
medium-sized manufacturers which are taken to be not financially constrained, I find that
5The employment size in the industrial sector is the employment size in the secondary industry consisting
of industry and construction sector minus that in the construction sector.
6To be rigorous, γ equals w(l − l̄)/y which is not exactly the labor income share wl/y. However, the
difference is numerically very small, so I treat them equally.
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Figure 2.2: CDFs of the Relative Productivity of Entrants from Model and
Data.
from 1998 to 2011, this ratio varies within [0.79, 0.85], so I take the median 0.83. Accord-
ingly, the output elasticity with respect to capital is α = 0.83− 0.46 = 0.37.
The productivity distribution of entrants G(z) is computed from Annual Surveys of Manu-
factures (ASM) from 1999 through 2007 conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of
China.7 The details are in Appendix B. Since the distribution can be well captured by a
Pareto distribution, I assume
g(z) =
τzτz−τ−1
1− zτ
for z ∈ [z, 1]. I choose the tail index τ and the minimum support z to match the 95%, 90%,
75%, 50% and 25% percentiles of entrants’ productivity distribution. The CDFs generated
by the model and the data are depicted in Figure 2.2, which shows the success of a Pareto
distribution specification.
For the transition matrix of productivity, the up and down step-size (nu, nd) is the corre-
7I am very grateful to Professor Heng Yin for providing me the data.
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sponding median step-size computed from ASM. Besides, the transition probability (pu(z), pd(z))
is computed as the probability of productivity going up by at least nu/2 steps and down by
at least nd/2 steps respectively. The ASM data shows that pu(z) is increasing in z while
pd(z) is decreasing, which reflects the intuition that it is harder for productive firms to
improve further but easier to deteriorate. Thus, I assume for any z ∈ [z, 1],
pu(z) =
pu(1)− pu(z)
1− z
(z − z) + pu(z), pd(z) =
pd(1)− pd(z)
1− z
(z − z) + pd(z)
The process of labor income shocks is imputed from Xu (2010). Using the China Health
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data, he estimated labor income shocks consisting of an
AR(1) permanent component and a MA(1) transient component. By matching two moment
conditions on the variance in labor income shocks and the autocovariance of the first-order
difference in labor income shocks in two adjacent periods, I compute the corresponding
parameters (ρ, σy) for the AR(1) specification used in this paper.
Next we determine policy parameters. For the entry cost ce at the pre-reform stage, since
they are highly correlated with firms’ entry and exit decision and the economy before the
policy change can be treated as along the old BGP, I choose this parameter to match the
pre-reform business density. Business density is defined as the number of enterprises over
the employment size in the industrial sector. The China Statistical Yearbook has provided
such information.8 I take the median business density from 1980 to 1991, 0.13%, as the
pre-reform business density.
As for the entry cost during the post-reform stage, I directly infer the change of entry costs
using World Development Indicators from the World Bank. According to this database, the
cost of business start-up procedures has decreased from 17.8% of GNI per capita in 2003
8The statistical standard was adjusted in 1998, and since then non-state-owned enterprises with annual
sales revenue below five million yuan have been excluded. Thus for consistency concern, I substitute the
number of collective-owned enterprises in 1998 for the number before 1998. Since before 1992, the major
participants in the market are state-owned and collective-owned enterprises, the sum of the number of these
two types of firms is the total number of industrial enterprises.
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to 4.5% of GNI per capita in 2010. Assuming the entry cost in the model is proportional
to the cost of start-up procedures and adjusting the change in the GNI per capita (using
real GDP per capita from the Penn World Table 7.1 instead), I find that the entry cost
in China has decreased by 64.13% from 2003 to 2010. The Chinese government extended
the market-oriented reform to the whole country in 1992, and since then, domestic private
economy has grown very fast. We can take this institution change as the starting point of
business deregulation. Thus, given the data from 2003 to 2010, I extrapolate the entry cost
till 1992, and by my calculation, the entry cost has decreased by 92.84% from 1992 to 2010.
Now three parameters governing financial frictions (φp, cp, λ). For φp, since the stock market
was not established till 1990, it is reasonable to choose φp = 1 for the old BGP. As described
in the institution background part, during the past 20 years, the stock market in China has
rapid development. Nowadays, the underwriter’s discount, which is the main part of the IPO
cost, is about 5-7% of gross proceeds in China according to the Wind financial database.
Together with other types of cost like legal-related fees, costs netted against proceeds is
roughly 10% of gross proceeds. Thus, I set φp = 0.1 along the new BGP. For the fixed cost
cp, it is directly associated with the IPO decision, so I choose it to match the fraction of
public firms out of all the firms, which is 0.0045 in 2010.9 The credit friction λ is calibrated
to match the indicator, domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP), from world bank,
as in Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011). In China, this indicator has changed from 62.6%
(average between 1977 and 1989) to 103.3% (average from 1990 to 2007 right before the
financial crisis). I choose year 1989 as the breaking point because a Trial Bankruptcy Law
for SOEs became effective in 1988 which could be seen as the start of the credit market
reform.
Table 2.1 lists the value of assigned parameters I use in the numerical analysis, and calibrated
parameters as well as matched moments other than percentiles of entrants’ productivity
distribution are listed in Table 2.2 below.
9The data I use is the number of listed A-share companies and the total number of industrial enterprises
from the China Statistical Yearbook (2014).
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Table 2.1: Assigned Parameter Values.
Parameter Value
CRRA coefficient σ 1.5
Correlation coefficient of labor income shock ρ 0.54
Standard deviation of labor income shock σy 0.68
Output elasticity with respect to capital α 0.37
Output elasticity with respect to labor γ 0.46
Overhead labor cost l̄f 0.5
Probability of improving relative productivity pu [0,0.39]
Probability of deteriorating relative productivity pd [0.68,0.37]
Productivity change (up) (1 + g)nu 1.46
Productivity change (down) (1 + g)−nd 0.69
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.1
Initial technology frontier Z̄0 0.8
Technological growth rate g 0.02
Tail index of entrants’ productivity distribution τ 1.08
Minimum support of z z 0.047
Measure of workers L 1000
IPO costs netted against proceeds φp [1,0.1]
Table 2.2: Matched Moments.
Data Model Parameter
Interest rate 0.045 0.045 β = 0.78
Business density 0.0013 0.0014 ce = 3
Credit/GDP (%) [62.6, 103.3] [62.3, 101.2] λ = [2.77, 1000]
Fraction of public firms 0.0045 0.0037 cp = 2485
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2.4.2 Results
The main results are listed in Table 2.3 below. Under these structural reforms, aggregate
output has increased by a factor of 2.4. Compared with the data, which is the purchasing
power parity converted GDP per capita (chain series) for China at 2005 international dollars
per person from the Penn World Table 7.1, it accounts for 46.6% of the change from 1990
to 2010 if the economy in 2010 is close to the new BGP. Moreover, with the labor migration
into the manufacturing sector, since the size of labor force increases and meanwhile more
individuals start their own business, the labor migration overall has a scale effect. As shown
in Table 2.3, it amplifies the output from 341.3 to 465.9 by a factor of 1.365, while business
density and prices remain the same. In addition, in the model, the technology frontier is
moving forward exogenously over time, so aggregate output is growing at 3.27% per period
along the BGP. If we take this exogenous change into account, the model can generate
(3.66× (1 + 3.27%)20 − 1)/5.18 = 115% of the growth.
The effect can be further decomposed by different types of reforms. Without financial de-
velopment, lowering entry costs alone can explain 17.2% of the output increase, and with
entry costs unchanged, financial development alone can explain 9.3% of the increase. The
sum of these two results is much smaller than the total effect 46.6%, which suggests a mul-
tiplicative effect. Intuitively, financial development and lower entry costs are complements,
so their effect will be mutually strengthened. Moreover, notice that the effect of credit
market reform is slightly larger than the effect of reforms in both credit and stock market.
This is because IPO introduces a trade off between risk diversification and profits (relaxed
credit constraints but higher overhead labor costs) for entrepreneurs, and in this numerical
analysis, risk diversification dominates. Besides, on top of business deregulation and credit
market reform, the establishment of stock market only increases the GDP by 1%, which is
because credit and stock markets are substitutes.
Table 2.3 also demonstrates the role of these structural reforms—reallocating resources from
inefficient to efficient firms through the increased market competition brought by more
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Table 2.3: Effects of Structural Reforms.
Output Business density Wage Interest rate
Benchmark 100 0.0014 100 0.045
Reforms 341.3 0.0043 335.4 0.135
+ Labor migration 465.9 0.0043 335.4 0.135
Dataa 618 0.0026 663
Decomposition
Entry costs 189.3 0.0073 183.9 0.035
Credit market 150.1 0.0039 146.1 0.16
Finance total 148.0 0.0010 144.1 0.155
Entry + Credit 340.4 0.0043 335.4 0.135
a Data source: Penn World Table 7.1, China Statistical Yearbook (2009, 2012).
entrants. Specifically, business deregulation encourages entry and financial development
promotes post-entry growth. Overall they lead to a larger entry size, which results in a
higher business density. As the market becomes more active, the competition is also fiercer.
As a result, the wage goes up which forces more inefficient firms to exit. Here, business
density defined as the number of enterprises over the size of labor force has increased to
0.0043. This is acceptable compared with the data in 2010, 0.0026. Besides, the wage rate
has risen by 235.4 times. It is half of that suggested by the data, 563.10
Table 2.4 decomposes the effect at the intensive and extensive margin. Specifically, first,
I start from the pre-reform BGP and compute the output with the firms’ distribution and
policies (ce, φp, λ) along the old BGP but using the business density and equilibrium prices
(r, w) on the new BGP. This measures the output change caused by a higher business density.
Next, I calculate the output under new policies, business density and prices but fixing the
10We have two series for the real wage. One is the growth rate of average real wage for all the workers
from 1991 to 2008, and the other is for all the urban workers from 1995 to 2010. Since there is a subtle
difference between two series, I combine the growth rate for all the workers from 1991 to 1994 with that for
all the urban workers from 1995 to 2010 to compute the growth of real wage between 1990 and 2010.
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Table 2.4: Decomposition of Effects.
Reallocation Entry
(a) Business Density (b) Intensive (c) Extensive (a) + (c)
z distribution∗ O O N
Policies O N N
Measure N N N
Prices N N N
Effects (%)∗∗ -24.74 22.32 102.42 77.68
∗In this table, O represents old (pre-reform) and N is new (post-reform).
∗∗Effects are calculated by dividing (a)-old, (b)-(a) and (c)-(b) by the total change respectively.
firms’ productivity distribution on the old BGP. The further change in the output in this
step captures the effect of reallocation at the intensive margin, that is, among incumbent
firms. At last, the difference between the post-reform output and the output in the last step
characterizes the effect of reallocation at the intensive margin. From Table 2.4, we can see
that output decreases through a pure business density channel. This is because the wage
rate has been pushed up very high due to the increased market competition caused by a
higher business density. Besides, reallocation at the intensive margin accounts for 22.32%
of the total GDP change in the model, and entry channel through both a higher business
density and reallocation at the extensive margin explains the rest 77.68%, which shows the
importance of entry.
2.4.3 Policy Analysis
After realizing the importance of market economy, the Chinese government has carried out
various policies to encourage entry and promote post-entry growth. For example, before
2008, corporate income tax rate for small firms is 18% or 27% (depends on the taxable
income level) while the standard tax rate is 33%, and under the new corporate tax law
carried out in 2008, small firms pay 20% income tax and large firms pay 25%. Besides, the
Chinese government has provided favorable loan terms to small firms. Analytically, it is
hard to assess which policy is more effective. The reason is as follows. Although inefficient
firms with high net worth have no external finance needs and thus do not benefit from loan
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subsidies, the saved benefits have been allocated to both efficient and inefficient firms with
low net worth. Since benefits to efficient firms increases the output and these to inefficient
firms are detrimental to the economy, the result depends on which force is stronger.
Since this model characterizes the firm-level behavior and thus is suitable to conduct firm-
level policy analysis, in this section, I compare these two policy tools numerically. The
experiment has the following steps. First, I impose 25% corporate income tax on all the firms
in the pre-reform economy, and use the correspondent equilibrium output as the benchmark.
Next, I assume small firms only need to pay 20% tax, denoted as τπ = 0.05. Here small firms
are defined as those with taxable income below a certain threshold which is determined by
dividing the cutoff income level 300,000 yuan (specified by the new corporate income tax
law) by the average corporate income 11,710,000 yuan in 2010 and then multiplying with
the average corporate income during the pre-reform stage in the model. At last, consider
loan subsidies on small firms, that is, they pay less interest rate r + δ − τr. τr is chosen
to satisfy the equivalent revenue rule. I also tried τπ = {0.10, 0.25} as a robustness check.
The results are listed in Table 2.5. From the table, we can see that according to this model,
tax deduction works better than loan subsidies for the Chinese economy, and both policies
have large allocation effects.
Table 2.5: Comparison of Policies.
τπ = 0.05 0.10 0.25
Tax deduction 1.38%a 3.34% 6.74%
Loan subsidies 0.76% 1.63% 4.94%
Total subsidies 0.006% 0.014% 0.048%
a The results in the first two rows are the output change. The unit
for all the results in the table is % of benchmark output.
2.4.4 Robustness Check
Table 2.6 below shows the results for various overhead labor costs, and the results have
little changes.
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Table 2.6: Robustness Check on Overhead Labor Costs.
l̄f = 0.25 0.5 1 2 5
Output 341.31 341.31 341.32 341.32 341.32
Business density (1/103) 4.282 4.276 4.277 4.272 4.272
a Data source: Penn World Table 7.1, China Statistical Yearbook (2009, 2012).
2.5 Conclusion
Along with the sustained rapid growth of China in the past twenty years, on the one
hand, the business density indicated by the number of firms becomes much higher and the
market selection effect is stronger as the wage has gone up and the dispersion of firms’
productivity distribution has shrunk, and on the other hand, the cost of business start-
up procedures has decreased gradually and the financial sector has experienced significant
development. Based on these observations, this paper investigates the effect of structural
reforms—business deregulation and financial development in both credit and stock market.
A dynamic general equilibrium growth model integrating costly entry, credit frictions, IPO
and dynamics of heterogenous firms and consumers is presented. Structural reforms lead
to an influx of new firms and thus a higher business density. As a result, the market
competition becomes fiercer and more inefficient firms exit. This induces resources to be
reallocated from inefficient to efficient firms and thus results in a higher aggregate output.
The quantitative analysis using the Chinese firm-level data shows that these structural
reforms play an important role in explaining the rapid growth of China. The effect of
business deregulation and that of financial development are mutually strengthened, and
in total they can explain 46.6% of the growth in the real GDP per capita of China from
1990 to 2010 while the entry margin accounts for 77.68% of the GDP change in the model.
Moreover, the model is used to evaluate relevant firm-level policies. By comparing tax
deduction and loan subsidies on small firms, the paper shows that both policies are very
effective and tax deduction has worked better for the Chinese economy.
72
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. If uncertainty is not resolved at period m, by Bayes’ rule, at period t for 0 ≤ t ≤ m,
the posterior distribution is Beta(β + t+ 1, γ). Thus, the posterior mean is
λt =
γ
β + γ + t+ 1
which is decreasing over time.
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. Since investors are risk neutral and β = 1/(1 + r), their consumption decision and
portfolio choice can be studied separately. Here, I focus on the portfolio choice. Since when
there is no uncertainty, the excess return from trading the risky asset is zero, investors’
objective function can be rewritten as maximizing the present value of their expected wealth
at the end of speculative period, and potential investors’ problem is
max
x,te
E0[
1
(1 + r)T+1
W iT |F0]
s.t.
W it = W
i
t−1(1 + r)− 1{t=te}e for 0 ≤ t ≤ te
W it = W
i
t−1(1 + r) + x
i
t−1(Pt +Dt − Pt−1(1 + r)) for t > te
xit ∈ [0, 1], 0 ≤ te ≤ T − 1
W i0 is given
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Define Lagrange function, take F.O.C., we get the optimal trading strategy, for te ≤ t ≤
T − 1,
xit =
 1 if E
i
t [Pt+1 +Dt+1] ≥ (1 + r)Pt
0 o.t.w.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. Here, we take the measure of rational investors trading the risky asset {nt} and
equivalently {qt} as given. As will be shown in Proposition 3.3, {qt} is common knowledge.
First, we show the result about belief updating. Take the price function as given, we have
the information contained in the price to be
ξt = Π + µtεq,t
where µt = pε,t/pΠ,t.
Notice that εq,t is i.i.d., which implies signals {ξt} and {Dt} are independent and i.i.d..
Thus, instead of the standard Kalman filter, we can directly apply the Bayesian rule, and
get the posterior belief on Π based on Fct to follow N(Ect [Π], 1/ρct) with
Ect [Π] =
ρct−1
ρct
Ect−1[Π] +
ρq/µ
2
t
ρct
ξt +
ρD,t
ρct
1
r
Dt
and
ρct = ρ
c
t−1 + ρD,t + ρq/µ
2
t
For the belief based on the total information available to investor i, i ∈ It, since private
signals are i.i.d. and also independent with other noise terms, we have the following Bayesian
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updating rule:
Eit [Π] = (1− αt)Ect [Π] + αt
1
t+ 1
t∑
m=0
Sim
where
αt =
ρS̃,t
ρct + ρS̃,t
, ρt = ρt−1 + ρD,t +
ρq
µ2t
+ ρS,t
Given belief updating rules, now we show that the price function has the linear form as given
in the Proposition. The method we use here is guess-and-verify and backward induction.
At t = T , uncertainty is resolved and thus PT = Π. Given this, at t = T − 1, if uncertainty
is not resolved, we have
EiT−1[PT +DT ] = E
i
T−1[Π + rΠ + εD,T ] = (1 + r)E
i
T−1[Π]
= (1 + r)((1− αT−1)EcT−1[Π] + αT−1
1
T
T−1∑
m=0
Sim)
Across investors, this generates a distribution following N(ĒT−1[PT +DT ], σ
2
T−1(PT +DT ))
with
ĒT−1[PT +DT ] = (1 + r)((1− αT−1)EcT−1[Π] + αT−1Π)
σT−1(PT +DT ) = (1 + r)αT−1
√
1/ρS̃,T−1
By Proposition 3.1, investors hold one unit of risky asset iff EiT−1[PT +DT ] ≥ (1 + r)PT−1.
This and the belief distribution we get above imply the following market clearing condition:
nT−1(1− Φ(
(1 + r)PT−1 − ĒT−1[PT +DT ]
σT−1(PT +DT )
)) = 1− εn,T−1
From which, we have
PT−1 =
1
1 + r
(ĒT−1[PT +DT ] + σT−1(PT +DT )Φ
−1(1−
1− εn,T−1
nT−1
))
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Plugging in the specification for noise traders (2.5), we get
PT−1 =
1
1 + r
(ĒT−1[PT +DT ] + σT−1(PT +DT )(qT−1 + εq,T−1))
Using the result for the belief distribution, we have
PT−1 = (1− αT−1)EcT−1[Π] + αT−1Π + αT−1
√
1
ρS̃,T−1
(qT−1 + εq,T−1)
Matching the coefficients gives us
pΠ,T−1 = αT−1
pq,(T−1)(T−1) = pε,T−1 = αT−1
√
1
ρS̃,T−1
Thus, the equilibrium price at period T −1 has the functional form given in the proposition.
Now assume the equilibrium price at period t+1 has the linear form given in the proposition,
we want to show that it also holds for period t.
By Proposition 2.1, if uncertainty is not resolved at t, investors expect the resolution prob-
ability in the next period to be λt. Thus
Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1] = (1− λt)Eit [(1− pΠ,t+1)Ect+1[Π] + pΠ,t+1Π +
T−1∑
m=t+1
pn,(t+1)mqm
+pε,t+1εq,t+1 + rΠ + εD,t+1] + λtE
i
t [Π + rΠ + εD,t+1]
Since by the belief updating rule for Ect+1[Π],
Eit [E
c
t+1[Π]] =
1
ρct+1
Eit [ρ
c
tE
c
t [Π] +
ρq
µ2t+1
ξt+1 + ρD,t+1
1
r
Dt+1]
=
ρct
ρct+1
Ect [Π] +
ρq/µ
2
t+1 + ρD,t+1
ρct+1
Eit [Π]
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we have
Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1] = (1 + r −At)Ect [Π] +AtEit [Π] + (1− λt)
T−1∑
m=t+1
pq,(t+1)mqm
where
At = λt(1 + r) + (1− λt)((1− pΠ,t+1)(1− ρct/ρct+1) + pΠ,t+1 + r)
Using the belief updating rule for Eit [Π], we further have
Eit [Pt+1+Dt+1] = (1+r−Atαt)Ect [Π]+Atαt
1
t+ 1
t∑
m=0
Sim+(1−λt)
T−1∑
m=t+1
pq,(t+1)mqm (A.1)
Across investors, it follows N(Ēt[Pt+1 +Dt+1], σ
2
t (Pt+1 +Dt+1)) with
Ēt[Pt+1 +Dt+1] = (1 + r −Atαt)Ect [Π] +AtαtΠ + (1− λt)
T−1∑
m=t+1
pq,(t+1)mqm (A.2)
σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1) = Atαt
√
1/ρS̃,t
This implies the market clearing condition
nt(1− Φ(
(1 + r)Pt − Ēt[Pt+1 +Dt+1]
σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)
)) = 1− εn,t
From which, we have
Pt =
1
1 + r
(Ēt[Pt+1 +Dt+1] + σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)Φ
−1(1− 1− εn,t
nt
))
= (1− Atαt
1 + r
)Ect [Π] +
Atαt
1 + r
Π +
1− λt
1 + r
T−1∑
m=t+1
pq,(t+1)mqm +
Atαt
1 + r
√
1
ρS̃,t
(qt + εq,t)
This confirms our conjecture about the price function, and by matching the coefficients, we
have
pΠ,t =
Atαt
1 + r
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pq,tm =
1− λt
1 + r
pq,(t+1)m for t+ 1 ≤ m ≤ T − 1
pq,tt = pε,t =
Atαt
1 + r
√
1
ρS̃,t
This completes the proof.
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. We first show that the expected excess return from trading the risky asset at period
t if uncertainty is not resolved is the same conditional on any Fem for 0 ≤ m ≤ t.
Notice that by the proof of Proposition 3.2,
Pt =
1
1 + r
(Ēt[Pt+1 +Dt+1] + σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)(qt + εq,t))
we have
Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1]− (1 + r)Pt
= Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1]− Ēt[Pt+1 +Dt+1]− σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)(qt + εq,t)
= (1 + r)pΠ,t(
1
t+ 1
t∑
m=0
Sim −Π)− σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)(qt + εq,t)
where the second equals sign uses (A.1) and (A.2).
Since {εiS,m}tm=1 and εq,t are independent with any Fem for 0 ≤ m ≤ t, we know that
(Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1]− (1 + r)Pt)|Fem ∼ N(−σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)qt, σ2t (Pt+1 +Dt+1)(1 +
1
ρq
))
so the expected excess return from trading the risky asset at period t is also the same for
any Fem, 0 ≤ m ≤ t, and can be denoted as vt. It is given by
vt = E[max{Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1]− (1 + r)Pt, 0}|Fet ]
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Using the distribution we have derived above,
vt =
∫ ∞
0
xφ(
x+ σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)qt
σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)
√
1 + 1ρq
)dx
which gives
vt = σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)(
√
1 +
1
ρq
φ(− qt√
1 + 1ρq
)− qtΦ(−
qt√
1 + 1ρq
))
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are PDF and CDF of the standard normal distribution respectively.
As a result, total expected excess returns discounted to period t from entering at t is
Vt =
T−1∑
m=t
(
1
1 + r
)m−t(Πm−1j=t (1− λj))vm
By Proposition 3.1, investors want to maximize their discounted expected wealth at period
T . Thus, potential investors will enter only if
Vt ≥ e
Moreover, they also need to decide when to enter. Since potential investors make the same
entry decision, if there are new entrants at both period t and t+1, the following indifference
condition must hold:
Vt − c =
1
1 + r
Et[max{Vt+1 − c, 0}|Fet ]
which implies
vt = (1−
1− λt
1 + r
)e
where λt = γ/(β + γ + t + 1) is investors’ expectation on the probability that uncertainty
will be resolved in the next period, in which case they will not enter.
In addition, in this model, investors can always choose not to hold the risky asset, so it is
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obvious that there are always positive expected gains for investors to trade the risky asset
before uncertainty gets resolved. Thus, nt is nondecreasing during those T periods.
At last, we show result (4). Since
∂vt
∂qt
= −Φ(− qt√
1 + 1ρq
) < 0
vt is decreasing in qt and thus in nt. This and the indifference condition indicate that as
long as (1 − (1 − λt)/(1 + r))/σt(Pt+1 + Dt+1) is decreasing over time, we have gradual
inflows of investors. In addition, as investors’ beliefs gradually converge, vt decreases over
time, so potential investors will keep entering till Vt < e.
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. The proof consists of two parts. We first show the existence and uniqueness for the
equilibrium price function, then for the measure of rational investors trading the risky asset.
Recall the proof to Proposition 3.2, we have
µt = pε,t/pΠ,t =
√
1/ρS̃,t
thus,
ρct = ρ
c
t−1 + ρD,t + ρq/µ
2
t = ρ
c
t−1 + ρD,t + ρS̃,tρq
this gives
ρct = ρ
c
0 +
t∑
m=0
(ρD,m + ρS̃,mρq)
By the proof of Proposition 3.2, ρct uniquely determines {pΠ,t, {pq,tm}T−1m=t, pε,t}. This sug-
gests the existence and uniqueness of parameters in the price function.
The existence of the measure of rational investors trading the risky asset {nt} is obvious.
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Now we show its uniqueness. Suppose not, then there exist two equilibria N1t ≡ {n1t } and
N2t ≡ {n2t } s.t. N1t 6= N2t . There must exist 0 ≤ t̃ ≤ T − 1, s.t. n1t̃ 6= n
2
t̃
and n1t = n
2
t
for t̃ + 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Without loss of generality, assume n1
t̃
> n2
t̃
. Since n1t = n
2
t for
t̃+ 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and the flow payoff vt is strictly decreasing in nt, we have
Vt̃(n
1
t̃
, n1
t̃+1
, . . . , n1T−1) < Vt̃(n
2
t̃
, n2
t̃+1
, . . . , n2T−1) ≤ e
This and for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, Vt(nt, . . . , nT−1) ≤ e with “<” only if nt = nt−1 imply
n1
t̃
= n1
t̃−1
Thus
n1
t̃−1 = n
1
t̃
> n2
t̃
≥ n2
t̃−1
Continuing this process, we will get
n10 > n
2
0 ≥ n−1, V0(N1t ) < V0(N2t ) ≤ e
From n10 > n
2
0 ≥ n−1, we know that for {n1t }, there are capital inflows at period 0. This
implies V0(N
1
t ) = e, contradicting with V0(N
1
t ) < V0(N
2
t ) ≤ e.
Therefore, {nt} must be unique.
A.1.6 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. First, we introduce some notations:
Ot =
σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)
1− 1−λt1+r
Bt =
1
1− 1−λt−1
1+r
(1 + r − (1− λt−1)
ρct−1
ρct
)αt−1
√
1
ρS̃,t−1
1
1− 1−λt
1+r
(1 + r)
√
1
ρS̃,t
− 1
1− 1−λt−1
1+r
(1− λt−1)
ρct−1
ρct
αt−1
√
1
ρS̃,t−1
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Ct =
1
1−λt−1
1+r
ρct−1
ρct
αt−1
(Bt−1 − (1−
1− λt−1
1 + r
ρct−1
ρct
)αt−1)
Dt = Bt
1
√ρS̃,t
Assume the following regularity conditions:
(A1) Bt ≥ 0 for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 2. There exists t̃ s.t. 0 < t̃ ≤ T − 2, Dt−1 < Dt for
0 ≤ t < t̃, and Dt−1 > Dt for t̃ ≤ t ≤ T − 2.
(A2) pΠ,T−2 = (1− 1−λT−21+r (1− αT−1)
ρcT−2
ρcT−1
)αT−2 < BT−2.
(A3) c ≤ v0(qn,−1)/(1− λ01+r )
Now we show that under those regularity conditions, we have gradual inflows of investors
for some periods before they stop. To show this, by (1.8), we only need to show that Ot
increases first then decreases.
Since
Ot+1 −Ot =
σt+1(Pt+2 +Dt+2)
1− 1−λt+11+r
− σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1)
1− 1−λt1+r
Using the results for σt(Pt+1 +Dt+1) and pΠ,t, we have
Ot+1 −Ot =
(1 + r)pΠ,t+1
√
1
ρS̃,t+1
1− 1−λt+11+r
−
(1 + r)(1− 1−λt1+r (1− pΠ,t+1)
ρct
ρct+1
)αt
√
1
ρS̃,t
1− 1−λt1+r
Using Assumption (A1), we get
sgn(Ot+1 −Ot) = sgn(pΠ,t+1 −Bt+1) (A.3)
Similarly,
sgn(Ot −Ot−1) = sgn(pΠ,t −Bt)
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plugging in
pΠ,t = (1−
λt
1 + r
(1− pΠ,t+1)
ρct
ρct+1
)αt
we have
sgn(Ot −Ot−1) = sgn(pΠ,t+1 − Ct+1) (A.4)
Besides,
Bt+1 − Ct+1 =
1
1−λt
1+r
ρct
ρct+1
αt
((
1− λt
1 + r
ρct
ρct+1
αtBt+1 + (1−
1− λt
1 + r
ρct
ρct+1
)αt)−Bt)
which gives
sgn(Bt+1 − Ct+1) = sgn(Dt+1 −Dt) (A.5)
Assumption (A2) and (A.3) imply OT−2 < OT−3. By Assumption (A1), DT−3 > DT−2,
and thus BT−2 < CT−2. This and Assumption (A2) indicate pΠ,T−2 < CT−2, and with
(A.4), this gives OT−3 < OT−4. By (A.3), we have pΠ,T−3 < BT−3. We can continue this
process till period t̃− 1, and we have Ot̃−2 > Ot̃−1 > . . . > OT−2.
For period t̃− 1, if pΠ,t̃−1 > Ct̃−1, we have Ot̃−3 < Ot̃−2 and thus by (A.3), pΠ,t̃−2 > Bt̃−2.
Since Dt is increasing before t̃ which implies Bt̃−2 > Ct̃−2, pΠ,t̃−2 > Ct̃−2 and thus by (A.4),
Ot̃−4 < Ot̃−3. Continuing this process till period 0, we have O0 < . . . < Ot̃−2. Therefore,
Ot is increasing from period 0 to t̃−2 and decreasing afterwards. This means that there are
gradual inflows of investors till period t̃−2 or earlier when Vt < c. Furthermore, Assumption
(A3) guarantees positive inflows at the first period.
If pΠ,t̃−1 < Ct̃−1, by (A.4), Ot̃−3 > Ot̃−2. There are two possibilities here. One is pΠ,t < Ct
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ t̃ − 1. This implies that Ot is decreasing over time. By Assumption (A3),
we have inflows of investors at the first period and none afterwards. The other possibility
is that there exists a t̃′ s.t. 0 < t̃′ < t̃− 1 and pΠ,t̃′ > Ct̃′ . Following the same procedure as
above, we can show that Ot is increasing from period 0 to t̃
′− 1 and decreasing afterwards,
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and thus we have gradual inflows of investors first and they stop at period t̃′ − 1 or earlier
when Vt < e.
A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. Using the results for ({pq,tm}T−1m=t, pq,tt) in Proposition 3.2, we can rewrite price move-
ments as
4P̄t = (1−
1− λt
1 + r
)(
T−2∑
m=t
(Πmj=t+1
1− λj
1 + r
)(1 + r)(Om+1qm+1 −Omqm)
−(ΠT−1m=t+1
1− λm
1 + r
)(1 + r)OT−1qT−1)
where Ot =
σt(Pt+1+Dt+1)
1− 1−λt
1+r
, as defined in the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Under regularity conditions (A1)-(A3), from the proof of Proposition 4.1, we know that Ot
is increasing first then decreasing. Thus for period t,
(1) If Om is decreasing at t ≤ m ≤ T − 1, since qm is nondecreasing, we have 4Pt < 0.
(2) If Ot+1 > Ot, assume 4Pt < 0, with nondecreasing qm, we have
4P̄t+1 = 4n1,t+1 +4n2,t+1
=
1− 1−λt+11+r
1−λt+1
1+r
(
4n1,t +4n2,t
1− 1−λt1+r
− (1 + r)(Ot+1qt+1 −Otqt))
< 0
This implies that if 4Pt < 0, 4Pm < 0 for any t ≤ m ≤ T − 1.
Therefore, there exists t̃ s.t. 0 ≤ t̃ < T − 1, 4Pt ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ t < t̃ and 4Pt < 0 for
t̃ < t ≤ T − 1.
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A.1.8 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. From the proof of Proposition 3.3, we have
Eit−1[Pt +Dt]− (1 + r)Pt−1 = (1 + r)pΠ,t−1(
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
Sim −Π)− σt−1(Pt +Dt)(qt−1 + εq,t−1)
Thus, Eit−1[Pt +Dt] ≥ (1 + r)Pt−1 implies
√
tρS(
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
Sim −Π) ≥
√
tρS
σt−1(Pt +Dt)
(1 + r)pΠ,t−1
(qt−1 + εq,t−1) = qt−1 + εq,t−1
Here,
√
tρS(
1
t
∑t−1
m=0 S
i
m −Π) ∼ N(0, 1).
Similarly, Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1] < (1 + r)Pt implies
√
ρS(S
i
t −Π) ≤
√
t+ 1(qt + εq,t)−
√
t(
√
tρS(
1
t
t−1∑
m=0
Sim −Π))
where
√
ρS(S
i
t −Π) ∼ N(0, 1).
Let εq,t = 0, ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T . We have at time t, the volume of speculative trading is
TV t = nt−1Pr(E
i
t−1[Pt +Dt] ≥ (1 + r)Pt−1, Eit [Pt+1 +Dt+1] < (1 + r)Pt)
= nt−1
∫ ∞
qt−1
Φ(
√
t+ 1qt −
√
ty)φ(y)dy
Here, after capital inflows stop, nt and qt will stay constant. Denoting them as n and q,
given y ≥ q, we have
∂(
√
t+ 1q −
√
ty)
∂t
<
1
2
(
1√
t+ 1
− 1√
t
)q < 0
and thus, TV t is decreasing over time, which also implies it should peak before or when
capital inflows stop.
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Notice that the volume of speculative trading only depends on capital flows in recent two
periods, so we can denote it as TV t(qt−1, qt) and it is easy to check that it is increasing in
qt. Given qt−1 and qt, define 4TV t(qt+1) = TV t+1(qt, qt+1)−TV t(qt−1, qt). It is continuous
and increasing in qt+1, 4TV t(qt) < 0, and limqt+1→+∞4TV t(qt+1) = 1−TV t(qt−1, qt) > 0.
These properties indicate that there exists q̃t+1 > qt, s.t. 4TV t > 0 for qt+1 > q̃t+1. Thus
with sufficient capital inflows, the volume of speculative trading increases over time.
A.2 Discussion on noise traders
The intuition for the specification of noise traders is as follows. In each period, due to
differential private information, rational investors differ in the highest price they are willing
to pay for the risky asset, which I call price target. Under the assumption of normal
distributions for the prior and signals, given all the available information including the
current price, the distribution of price targets across rational investors trading the risky
asset also follows a normal distribution. This and the short-sale constraint indicate that
the current asset price should equal the price target of the investor at the highest
1−εn,t
nt
-
quantile of this distribution. In most cases, prices are above those investors’ average price
target. Thus, I define q̃t to be how many units of standard deviation the price is above those
investors’ average price target. In equilibrium, the asset demand equals the asset supply,
i.e.,
nt(1− Φ(q̃t)) = 1− εn,t
this implies
q̃t = Φ
−1(
ñt − 1
nt
)
where Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. Since the total measure of
investors trading the risky asset is noisy, this distance measure q̃t is also noisy and thus
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I assume it equals qt plus a normal noise term. Under this specification, nt is strictly
increasing in qt. The intuition is as follows. Given εn,t = 0, with capital inflows, that is, nt
increases, there are more investors, especially optimistic investors, trading the risky asset.
Thus the equilibrium price is higher and so is the distance between the price and investors’
average price target qt.
A.3 Computation
The computation procedure for solving the equilibrium is:
(1) Compute {λt} using Proposition 2.1.
(2) By Proposition 3.2, compute {ρct} first, then {pΠ,t, pε,t, (pq,tm)m≥t}.
(3) By Proposition 3.4, the linear partially revealing equilibrium is unique, so we can solve
equilibrium capital flows by construction. By Proposition 4.1, we have gradual inflows
of rational investors and they stop after some periods. Thus, first, using (1.9), solve
{nt} and find the period t1 after which nt starts to decrease (with cap restrictions on
capital flows {n̄t}, denoting the above solution as {ñt}, we have nt = min{ñt, n̄t});
next, using (1.8), compute Vt if capital inflows stop at period t, find the first period t2
when Vt < e; t̃ = min{t1, t2} is the period when capital inflows stop. Re-solve nt̃ s.t.
Vt̃ = e. Thus, the equilibrium measure of rational investors trading the risky asset is
{n1, . . . , nt̃, . . . , nt̃}.
In addition, trading volume is computed using Gauss-Legendre quadrature, and the measure
of first-time buyers is by simulation.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Data: Productivity
The data for Chinese firms is from Annual Surveys of Industrial Production from 1998
through 2008 conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. It contains all non-
state owned enterprises with the annual revenue from principal business over 5 million yuan
(about 0.6 million dollars) and all state-owned enterprises.
First, I drop mining and utilities industry, which take up 8% of the whole sample, and focus
on manufacturing firms. Then I drop observations with no response or non-positive value
in either value-added, capital stock or labor, which account for 20.7% of the rest sample.
Since firms do not report their value added in year 2008, I use data from 1998 through 2007
to compute individual firms’ productivity below.
Next, I use the producer price index for manufactured goods as the deflator for the value-
added, and the price index for investment in fixed assets for the capital stock. The capital
stock is calculated by using the original value of capital minus the cumulative depreciation.
Ideally, we should use the producer price index for each industry as the deflator, but we
cannot because the data before 2002 is not available.
Given the production function, I calculate individual firms’ productivity by
Z̄tzit = yit/(k
α
itl
γ
it)
where yit is the deflated value-added of firm i at year t, kit is the deflated capital stock,
and lit is the annual average number of employed workers. Here, to reduce the bias caused
by the extreme value, I define the technology frontier Z̄t as the average TFP of the top 5%
firms in year t. I calculate zit for each year and then pool to get the distribution G(z).
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